N R DHANGAR Vs. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) SHRI M. M. Kaushik, counsel for the petitioner. Heard counsel in the matter of admission. We have heard Shri Kaushik in support of the grievance made by the petitioner assailing the order dated 30-10-1987, passed by the Commissioner, Public instructions, M. P. , Bhopal. We quote the order :-

(2.) A two-fold contention is pressed by Shri Kaushik in assailing the validity of the order. Firstly, counsel submits, the Commissioner not being the appointing authority had no power under the relevant rules, viz. , M. P. Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, to pass the order suspending the petitioner and, therefore, the order is without jurisdiction. However, on reading rule 9 (1) of the Rules aforesaid, we have no doubt that the contention is wholly meritless. The power to suspend a Government servant is given not only to the appointing authority but also to the disciplinary authority and any other authority empowered in that behalf by the Governor by general or special order. What cannot be disputed is that though the Commissioner was not the appointing authority of the petitioner, he was the disciplinary authority of the petitioner and, therefore, he had the jurisdiction to pass the impugned order.

(3.) SECONDLY, counsel contends, Rule 9 (1) (a) expressly uses the word "contemplated" and that word must also appear in impugned order of suspension. Indeed, the contention of the learned counsel is that if resort to this provision is taken, the authority must mention in the order that a "disciplinary proceeding is contemplated or is pending" against the person suspended. That no disciplinary proceeding is pending against the petitioner is clear, but it cannot be said that no disciplinary proceeding is contemplated against him. The mere non-mention of the word "contemplated", in our opinion, would not vitiate the order, because the facts mentioned in the order show that such a proceeding was in contemplation of the disciplinary authority. There was a serious charge against the petitioner of which mention was made in the very order of suspension. The purpose of mentioning in the order the charge in categorical terms indicated the contemplation of the disciplinary authority; it indicated that a disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner on the charge mentioned was in contemplation of the authority.