INDRAJEET SINGH Vs. JOINT REGISTRAR COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES

JUDGEMENT

(1.) HEARD Shri N. C. Jain, counsel for the petitioner on the question of admission.

(2.) THE District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. , Chhatarpur, is a Co-operative bank and the respondent No. 4 is a duly elected President of the Bank and the Board of directors. The petitioner claims to be an elected Director of the said Bank. The management of the affairs of the Bank vests in the Board of Directors which is a committee as defined in Section 2 (d) of the M P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). A notice was issued under sub-section (2) of Section 53 of the Act to respondent No. 4 in his capacity as President of the Board of Directors requiring cause to be shown as to why the Committee may not be superseded. In the same show cause notice there was an order under sub-section (10) of Section 53 of the act stating that the Board of Directors shall during the pendency of the enquiry function under the supervision of the Collector, Chhatarpur. It is this notice which has been challenged in the present writ petition.

(3.) IT was urged by the counsel for the petitioner that before passing the interim order under sub-section (10) of Section 53 of the Act, it was incumbent on the Joint registrar, Co-operative Societies who issued the impugned notice containing the said order under sub-section (10) of Section 53 to have given opportunity of hearing to the committee on principles of natural justice, We find it difficult to agree with this submission. ' Sub-section (10) of Section 53 contemplates an immediate action in proceedings under Section 53 (1 ). In Union of India vs. J. N. Sinha (A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 40) it was held that rules of natural justice are not embodied rules nor can they be elevated to the position of fundamental rights. Their aim is to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice. These Rules can operate only in areas not covered by any lav validly made. They do not supplant the law but supplement it If a statutory provision can be read consistently with the principles of natural justice, the courts should do so. But if a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any rules of natural justice then the court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice. Whether the exercise of a power conferred should be made in accordance with any of the principles of natural justice or not depends upon the express words of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power conferred, the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of the exercise of that power.