STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH Vs. NARAIN SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE State has preferred this appeal against order passed by Court below whereby the compromise in terms of section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was accepted and permission was granted to compound the offences.

(2.) THE learned counsel for the State submits that the case against the respondent was under sections 323, 147 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code. According to him, even if offences under sections 323 and 506 are compoundable but when section 147 is made applicable then notwithstanding the fact that main offence is compoundable no composition can be ordered vis-a-vis charge under section 147 of the Indian Penal Code. According to the learned counsel an offence under section 147 is not compoundable under any circumstances. He submits that an offence under section 147 is one against public tranquillity and it having been taken out of the orbit of section 320 of the Code, it should not have been compounded. He submits that the court below has acted contrary to the mandatory provisions and this error should be corrected. The view of various High Courts on this issue in this country is divergent.

(3.) ANOTHER decision which deals with this aspect of the matter is reported as Venkanna v. Crown, AIR 1923 Madras 592. In this case, it was observed that the compounding of an offence does not mean that the victim is willing either to give up or expect some form of solatium. Wallace, J. was of the opinion that this would not be a ground to permit compounding of an offence under section 143 of the Indian Penal Code. Again in Emperor v. Jarnali, AIR 1925 Lahore 464, Campbell, J. took the view as expressed by the Chief Court in Harisingh's case (supra). As a matter of fact, in a latter case, Crown v. Mohammad Hussain, AIR 1950 Lahore 121, a Division Bench has taken a view that merely because an offence under section 324 of the Indian Penal Code stands compounded it would not be enough to come to the conclusion that a charge under section 148 of the Penal Code would also fall. The view of the Patna High Court in Gurunarayan Das v. Emperor, AIR 1948 Patna 58 is again the same. The view of the Division Bench of that Court which is reported as Ramphal Gope v. State of Bihar, 1964(2) Cri LJ 111 is however to the contrary. This would be noticed at the later part of this judgment.