(1.) THE appellant-tenant has suffered a decree of eviction under the general law. Both the Courts have gone against him. The brief facts which led to the filing of this litigation be now noticed :
(2.) THE premises in question were let to the present appellant on 31st of January 1967. A rent-note was executed. This is Ex. P/2. In this, it has been mentioned that the monthly rent would be Rs. 60/-. The premises have been described as a 'shop'. The period of tenancy is 11 months. It has further been stated that after the expiry of the period of 11 months, the tenancy would come to an end. It has also been provided that if an occasion arises the tenancy can be terminated by giving one month's notice. It is not in dispute that at the time when the suit was filed the premises did not fall within the purview of Section 1(3) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It was precisely for this reason, a suit under the general law was filed. The suit was decreed. An appeal was preferred. This was dismissed. A Second Appeal came to be filed in this Court. In the meantime, the area where the building existed came to be included within the municipal limits. On the happening of this event, an argument was raised that the provisions of 1961 Act would become applicable and therefore, the decree if any passed has been rendered ineffective. As a matter of fact, this precise argument was noticed by this Court in the Second Appeal, which was registered as Second Appeal No. 330 of 1977. On 17th of December 1991, this Court remanded the case with a view to record a finding as to what would be the consequences of the area having been included within the municipal limits. The Court below has recorded a finding that the inclusion of the area within the municipal limits would not affect a pending proceeding. It has been held that the inclusion would have prospective effect only. It is this aspect of the matter, which is being challenged in this Court. It has also been argued that if the finding is recorded against the appellant with regard to the question regarding effect of extension of municipal limits, then the question as to whether notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was served in accordance with law or not would have to be gone into. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the premises were let for manufacturing purposes and therefore, the minimum notice of six months was required to be given. An argument has also been raised that the land was agricultural, and therefore, any tenancy given in breach of the provisions of M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 would lead to the conclusion that the present appellant had acquired ownership rights.
(3.) SO far as the first question with regard to the effect of the area being included within the municipal limits is concerned, I am of the opinion that the view expressed by this Court in its earlier decisions would be fully applicable to this case also. A decision bench of this Court in the case reported as Gokuldas Pagaria v. Parmanand Chaurasia, 1967 JLJ 581, held in categoric terms that the notification extending the municipal limits and thus, making the provisions of 1961 Act applicable to the area would have prospective effect only and it would not affect the pending suits. In the above case, the area in question was declared to be a cantonment area. The precise argument which was raised was raised before the Division Bench of this Court. This was negatived. It was specifically held that the provisions of the Act would not apply to pending suits. Same is the view expressed in the case reported as Prem Singh (Sardar) v. Gaya Prasad Sunderlal (Firm), 1972 RCR 603 (MP) : 1972 JLJ 651. Bishambhardayal, C.J. dealing with this precise question followed the view expressed by the Division Bench in Gokul Das v. Parmanand Chaursia, 1967 JLJ 581 (supra). In para 7, it was observed as under :