NIRANJAN SINGH Vs. SATYA WATI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal has been filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent by the owner of the truck bearing registration No. MPA 3078 against the order of the learned single Judge of this Court dated 11. 4. 1986 passed in M. A. No. 13 of 1982.

(2.) ON 18. 3. 1980, at about 8 p. m. , while Ramkishore, a cultivator, was taking his crop in his bullock-cart to his village Umari, the truck No. MPA 3078 belonging to the appellant and driven by respondent Premlal came from behind and collided with the bullock-cart as a result whereof Ramkishore sustained severe injuries and died. The widow of Ramkishore, respondent No. 1, for herself and as the natural guardian of her children, respondent Nos. 2 and 3, filed a claim petition under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, against the present appellant, the driver of the vehicle and the insurance company, respondent No. 5, for compensation in the sum of Rs. 4,30,000/- on account of the death caused due to rash and negligent act of the driver for which the owner was vicariously liable and the insurance company was liable under the policy issued by it. The Tribunal found that the said accident resulting in the death of Ramkishore was on account of negligence of the driver of the vehicle and awarded a sum of Rs. 12,000/- as compensation with interest at 6 per cent in favour of the claimants recoverable from the present appellant, the respondent driver and the insurance company. Against the said award dated 15. 7. 1981 of the Tribunal in Case No. 14 of 1981, the insurance company filed the said appeal which was partly allowed by the learned single Judge by the said order and the insurance company was absolved from the liability to indemnify the insured for payment of compensation to the claimants and the award passed by the Tribunal was maintained only against the present appellant and the driver of the vehicle, Premlal. The present Letters Patent Appeal has been filed against the said order of the learned single Judge.

(3.) THE learned Counsel for the appellant strenuously argued that the learned single Judge erred in absolving the insurance company merely on account of the fact that driver Premlal did not hold a driving licence at the time of the accident in question and this, according to the learned single Judge, had constituted breach of the conditions of the policy of insurance, relieving the company from any liability thereunder. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan 1987 ACJ 411 (SC), the learned Counsel argued that in order to relieve itself of its obligation under the policy of the insurance, the insurance company was required to demonstrate that there was a breach of the conditions attributable to the insured. Referring to para 12 of the said judgment of their Lordships, the learned Counsel contended that the exclusion clause in the policy of insurance has to be 'read down in order that it is not at war with the main purpose' of the provisions enacted for the protection of victims of accidents. Relevant portion of para 14 of the judgment in Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan (supra) reads as under: (14) In view of this provision apart from the implied mandate to the licensed driver not to place a non-licensed person in charge of the vehicle, there is also a statutory obligation on the said person not to leave the vehicle unattended and not to place it in charge of an unlicensed driver. What is prohibited by law must be treated as a mandate to the employee and should be considered sufficient in the eye of law for excusing non-compliance with the conditions. It cannot, therefore, in any case be considered as a breach on the part of the insured. To construe the provision differently would be to re-write the provision by engrafting a rider to the effect that in the event of the motor vehicle happening to be driven by an unlicensed person regardless of the circumstances in which such a contingency occurs, the insurer will not be liable under the contract of insurance. It needs to be emphasised that it is not the contract of insurance which is being interpreted. It is the statutory provision defining the conditions of exemption which is being interpreted. These must, therefore, be interpreted in the spirit in which the same have been enacted accompanied by an anxiety to ensure that the protection is not nullified by the backward looking interpretation which serves to defeat the provision rather than to fulfil its life-aim. To do otherwise would amount to nullifying the benevolent provision by reading it with a non-benevolent eye and with a mind not tuned to the purpose and philosophy of the legislation without being informed of the true goals sought to be achieved. What the legislature has given, the court cannot deprive of by way of an exercise in interpretation when the view which renders the provision potent is equally plausible as the one which renders the provision impotent. In fact, it appears that the former view is more plausible apart from the fact that it is more desirable. When the option is between opting for a view which will relieve the distress and misery of the victims of accidents or their dependants on the one hand and the equally plausible view which will reduce the profitability of the insurer in regard to the occupational hazard undertaken by him by way of business activity, there is hardly any choice. The court cannot but opt for the former view. Even if one were to make a strictly doctrinaire approach, the very same conclusion would emerge in obeisance to the doctrine of 'reading down' the exclusion clause in the light of the 'main purpose' of the provision so that the 'exclusion clause' does not cross swords with the 'main purpose' highlighted earlier. The effort must be to harmonize the two instead of allowing the exclusion clause to snipe successfully at the main purpose.