ISHWARI PRASAD GUPTA Vs. STATE OF M P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE common point of law involved in these two cases, which are heard together and are being disposed of by common judgment, vocalises a single grievance based on infraction of the statutory right inscribed in Section 25-F of the industrial Disputes Act (for short 'the Act' ).

(2.) STATE Counsel, Shri Qureshi, has laboured hard to convince me that the petitioners are not entitled to invoke this Court's writ jurisdiction because the alternative remedy available to them under the Act has not been exploited or exhausted. Counsel has placed reliance on a Bench decision of this Court in Paras kumar (1984 MPWN 436) wherein it was held that the petitioners having remedy of the Civil suit provided to them under Section 8 of the Public Trust Act, exercise of writ jurisdiction could not be invoked by them. Because the Apex Court in its recent decision in Ram Shyam Co. (AIR 1985 S. C. 1147) has stated the law authoritatively dealing with the same contention it behoves me to refer thereto immediately as law stated by their Lordship, in virtue of the constitutional mandate of Article 141, is binding on me and all courts and authorities in India, as the law of the land. Their lardships held that "the rule which requires the exhaustion of alternative remedies is a rule of convenience and discretion rather than rule of law. " It was held that the rule does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain complaints of violation of any constitutional right if the facts and circumstances of the case so warrant. Indeed, as has been pointed out by their Lordships, the rule does not merely speak of an "alternative remedy", the remedy contemplated must as well be effective and adequate in all respects if the rule has to be invoked in any case.

(3.) I have no doubt that in the instant case the petitioner, who served the State on daily wages, in one case for a period of over 3 years, and in another case for over 1 years, and who came to suffer eventually total loss of service, do not deserve to be pushed to the corridors of Labour Courts and Tribunals to come eventually to this court after fighting longdrawn battles in those courts to claim eventually, if necessary, the same relief by writs ofcertiorari though they can to-day claim in this Court writs of mandamus by directly assailing the orders passed against them terminating their, services illeeally in yiolation of Section 25-F aforesaid. Indeed, my attention is rightly drawn by Shri Upadhyaya, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, to the decision in L. Robert D'souza (AIR 1982 S. C. 854) to submit that the Apex Court did consider the grievance which the petitioners in those cases had made in the High court on the writ side and granted them relief which the Court had refused to them holding that noncompliance with the requirement of Section 25-F was fatal and termination of their services was illegal.