SUKHLAL Vs. NARAINPRASAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is defendants appeal who lost in both the Courts. Two short questions of law are agitated in this appeal and as such, it is not necessary for me to make detailed investigation of respective cases of parties pleaded and proved In Courts below.

(2.) TO dispose of the two contentions which appellants' counsel has raised in this appeal, I may refer immediately to the few admitted facts relevant to the questions agitated. The plaintiffs themselves based their claim on the fact that the suit land was Zamindari land and they were bolding the land as Pukhta mourusi tenant while, on the other hand, the defendants themselves claimed that they were sub -tenants under the plaintiffs. The two provisions of the M. B. Zamindari Abolition Act, for short, the 'Act' on "which the twin contentions agitated by Shri Vajpai are based may be read in Section 38 and 56 of the Act. Indeed, counsel's contention based on Section 315 further is that because of the steps taken by the defendants there under in 1955 to assert their statutory right, they acquired a tide in the suit land' adverse to the plaintiffs and as such, the suit was barred by Article 65 of the Limitation Act. Shri Sapre, appearing for the plaintiffs/respondents, while conceding to the fact that in 1955, defendants had filed an application in Tahsildars' Court making the requisite deposit contemplated under Section 38 (2), but in that application they also made a prayer for mutation and as such, the effect of the decision rendered thereon must be decided in terms of Section 86 (4) of the M. B. Lana Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950. Counsel has also cited a number of decisions to repel and rebut appellants' contention that the suit was barred under Article 65 of the Limitation Act and urged that the concurrent finding of the Courts below on the question invited no interference of this Court in second appeal.

(3.) NOW I take up the question of limitation. If I read anything in Section 38 (2) of the Act in the context not only of sub -section (1) thereof but also clause (b) of Section 158 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, for short, the 'Code', it is this. A sub -tenant, staking l1is claim to be a pakka tenant under Section 38 (2) would leave nothing in the hands of anybody else except the estate because he thereby asserts not only his tenancy rights in the land, but virtually ownership in the land. Indeed, as appears clear from sub -section (1) of Section 38 the tenant of a proprietor under whom a sub -tenant used to hold the land, ceased to have any interest in the land as soon as not he, but the subtenant becomes a pakka tenant. What is further contemplated under sub section (2) is that a sub tenant becomes a pacca tenant by depositing requisite amount to exercise the statutory right granted to him there under and the superior interest of the tenant is put on the stake as soon as his sub -tenant chooses to exercise his statutory right. Now according to Section 158 (1) (b) of the Code, a pakka tenant becomes a bhumiswami by operation of law, which lea yes obviously nothing in the hands of the tenant Shri Sapre's contention, therefore, that the Courts below rightly decided issue No.2 on the question of limitation in favour of the plaintiff is not tenable: inasmuch as the Courts below, as earlier alluded, overlooked the legal position manifested in sub -section (1) and (2) of Section 38 of the Act and Section 158 (1) (b) of the Code. The statutory rights envisaged under the provi3ions aforesaid are indeed to be judicially noticed as yet. I say this after hearing arguments advanced at the Bar and applying my mind to the decisions cited by Shri Sapre. I have no hesitation to say at once that the legal adage -once a tenant always a tenant -is statutorily effaced by the provisions of Section 38 of the Act and S. 158 of the Code. The special law must prevail on the general law and must be given full meaning and effect.