LAUKI DEVI Vs. SARDAR GURLAL SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal filed under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is directed against the order dated 31-5-82 passed by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation Durg in case Nos. 26/80 and 27/80 dismissing the claim of the appellants on account of accidental death of Amarnath.

(2.) DECEASED Amarnath was employed as a driver with respondent No. 1 and was driving their truck No. MHG 4005 when he met with an accident on 28-4-73. As a result of the injury received in the aforesaid accident Amarnath died on 3-5-73. Since Amarnath was an employee and died of employment injury, it was claimed that the appellants were entitled to pay compensation under the Act. The application claiming compensation was however filed on 12-5-80 i.e. about more than 7 years after the death of Amarnath. It may be mentioned that appellant No. 1, the widow of late Amarnath filed her separate claim whereas the 2 other appellants being minor son and daughter of the deceased filed their separate claim. The two claims were however heard and decided together and disposed of by the impugned order. The learned Commissioner on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record held that there was no sufficient cause for condoning delay of about 5 years. The claims were accordingly dismissed.

(3.) AS far as the finding that the appellant No. 1 had no "sufficient cause" for filing the application after about 5 years of expiry of period of limitation is concerned, the same appears to be well merited in the context of facts and circumstances of the case. Amarnath died on 3-5-73 and therefore the application claiming compensation should have been made within 2 years from that date. When the legislature provides a period of limitation for preferring such claims it must be presumed to have fixed the outer limit which must be followed as a general rule. Extension of time fixed by the legislature must therefore he held to be an exception. That is why the Commissioner has been given the discretion in the matter which discretion has to be exercised only if the claim had not been preferred in time due to sufficient cause. The word sufficient cause must mean the something as the reasonable cause for delay and must therefore exclude every unreasonable cause. The case of the appellant No. 1 is that she had been approaching the employer and the insurance company with the request for payment of compensation. As far as employer is concerned there is nothing on record to indicate that he at any time made any promise. On the contrary the letter 29-3-75 (Ex. P-2) written by the Insurance Company would indicate that the employer was not communicating even with the Insurance Company. In case an employer does not communicate even with the Insurance Company far so long, the normal assumption should be that the employer was not paying any attention to the alleged claim. To persue the matter with such an employer for another period of 5 years, cannot be a reasonable attitude. Under the circumstances it was the obligation of the appellant No. 1 to file the claim within a reasonable period after the receipt of letter Ex. P-2. Under the circumstances the finding that the appellant No. 1 had no sufficient cause for filing the application beyond the period of limitation is the correct finding needing no interference of this court,