SHYAM SUNDER AGRAWAL Vs. KARTAR SINGH SHARMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE records were called for and are before me today. The insurance policy, which the insurer's counsel has relied on, is exhibit P-1 and I have perused the same. Counsel relied on condition No. 1 of the conditions of the policy to submit that no notice, contemplated thereunder, having admittedly been given to the insurer, the latter is not liable to be saddled with any liability which has been attached to it by the award passed in the instant case by the Tribunal. That is the only short point on which a decision has to be rendered by me in this appeal.

(2.) SHRI Dubey has relied on three decisions rendered by courts in comparable jurisdiction. The first decision is the one rendered by a High Court in Malaysia in the case of Public Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Lee Chau [1969] ACJ 452. The second one is of the Court of Appeal in England in the case of Alien v. Rables [1970] ACJ 299 (CA ). In the third decision, which is of the Privy Council in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Yeo Beng Chow alias Yeo Beng Chong [1973] ACJ 200 (PC), the appeal was heard from a judgment rendered by the Federal Court of Malaysia. These decisions do not at all bother or trouble me, because the law in India is codified and I have a right to look to the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short, "the Act"), to decide the issue. What is the law in England or in Malaysia may be relevant for the consideration of those decisions. But, the same is not relevant for the purpose of the decision of the case before me. The rights of the parties in this case, the claimants, the owner and the driver of the offending motor vehicle and the insurer are regulated exclusively by the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Act. I propose, therefore, to refer immediately to Sub-section (2) (b) of Section 96 of the Act as also to Sub-section (6) thereof. Reference has also to be made to Sub-section (3) of Section 97.

(3.) I have no doubt at all about the purport of the provisions contained in Sub-section (2) (b) of Section 96 which, I must say, meets squarely and fully Shri Dubey's objection. I have no mind at all to hear him argue or to accept his argument that Clause (b), which I quote below, is not exhaustive, but is illustrative of the defences open to the insurer. I quote :