JANDEL SINGH Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The short order, which we have proposed to pass in this case, leaves us clear and excuses us from considering several weighty submissions made by the petitioner's counsel on several aspects of the lis.

(2.) What is not disputed in this case is that the petitioner was convicted in the course of a Court-martial proceeding held under the Army Act, 1950, (for short the 'Act') and he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. He is serving his sentence in Gwalior Central Jail from where he preferred this petition to this Court claiming inter alia that his application under Section 182 of the Army Act is awaiting consideration of the Chief of the Army Staff (Respondent No. 2) for the last five months.

(3.) What Shri Mittal, Counsel for the respondents, contends is that though the application was filed admittedly on 23-8-1985 the petitioner's confinment ought to be computed in terms of Section 167 of the Act. However, we are not prepared to enter into this broad question despite what is said in Bhagirath, AIR 1985 SC 1050 because what has alarmed us is the callous attitude of the authorities in dealing with the petition filed five months ago. The entire conspectus of all the provisions embraced by Chapter XIV of the Act which deals with the case of "pardons, remission and suspensions" make it transparently clear that the power reposited in Section 182 must be exercised in a reasonable manner and within reasonable period. The Chief of Army Staff under Section 182 of the Act is statutorily empowered to consider a prayer for suspension of sentence imposed by Court-martial and as such it is the duty of the second respondent to act reasonably in the matter by considering and disposing of the application expeditiously. We have no manner of doubt that the power is saddled with the duty to do so which must be discharged by the statutory authority in a reasonable manner and the authority is not authorised to sit over the application and refuse to render any decision thereon. To hold to the contrary would be to allow the authority to act arbitrarily, which cannot be constitutionally done.