SHANTI PRASAD AGRAWAL Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revision application is directed against the order dated 29th August 1970 whereby the learned Second Additional District Judge, Gwalior, rejected the petitioner's application under section 16 of the Arbitration Act.

(2.) ONLY one point has been pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner and it is this that the learned Additional District Judge committed an illegality in exercise of his jurisdiction in not remitting the award in respect of the amount of Rs. 8,893.29 P. claimed by the petitioner on account of goods tax paid by him under the M.P. Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Goods) Act, 1962 (which will hereinafter be referred to as the Act). He has submitted that the error of law is apparent on the face of the award. In this connection he has relied upon section 4 (3) (proviso) of the M.P. Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Goods) Act, 1962, Union of India v. Bungo Steel Furniture Pvt. Ltd. : A I R 1967 S C 1032, M. P. Transport Company Pvt. Ltd. v. State of M. P. : 1962 M P L J 633 : A I R 1962 M P 108 and Jaykumar and others v. Omprakash, 1969 M P L J 931 : : 1970 J L J 592.

(3.) THE only question therefore is whether the award in the present case suffers from any such infirmity. Section 4 (3) (proviso) of the Act only lays down that the tax levied under this section may be collected by the owner along with the freight charged. It is, however, conceded that there was no condition in the agreement between the parties that the goods tax in question would be paid by the Union of India. Learned counsel submits that at the time the agreement was entered into there was no such tax as the M. P. Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Goods) Act, 1962 came into force later. He also candidly conceded that there was no subsequent agreement by the Union of India whereby the latter agreed to pay the tax in questions. Thus, the Arbitrator rightly observed in his award that the petitioner is not entitled to be re imbursed for the goods -tax in question paid by him, either under any agreement between the parties or by virtue of any statutory provision. All that section 4 (3) (proviso) lays down is that the owner of the vehicle is bound to pay the goods -tax though it may be open to him to collect the same along with the freight charged. The question whether in a particular case, the owner of the vehicle would be entitled to collect the tax from the owner of the goods with the freight charged would depend upon the terms of the agreement between the owner of the vehicle and the owner of the goods. Consequently, there is no escape from the conclusion that there is no statutory provision entitling the petitioner to recover the tax in question from the opposite party. I am thus clearly of opinion that there is no apparent error of law in the award made by the arbitrator. In this view of the matter, no interference can be made with the impugned order.