KEJURAM Vs. RAMDAYAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE only question in this appeal is whether the appellant's suit was within time. THEy alleged that on the death of their father, Surit, they had neither a natural guardian, nor a guardian appointed by the Court. Ramcharan (defendant 4) just started managing their property. Later on, without any right or authority, he transferred the suit property to the other defendants. THE plaintiff, therefore, claimed a decree for possession of the alienated lands. THE trial Court held that the Ramcharan acted merely as a de facto guardian; that the transfer of the suit land was without any legal necessity, nor was it for the benefit of the estate; and that Ramcharan brought the sale proceeds to his own use. A decree for possession was passed in the plaintiffs' favour. THE first appellate Court, while maintaining the finding that the sale could not be upheld for want of legal necessity or benefit of the estate, reversed the decree of the trial Court holding that the suit was barred by limitation. THE finding of fact has not been, nor could be, attacked before me.

(2.) THE demised lands were occupancy within the meaning of the C. P. Tenancy Act, 1920. THE sale deed is dated 28 January 1952. Plaintiff 1, Kejuram, attained majority on 3 April 1959. THE suit was commenced on 21 April 1959. THE first appellate Court applied Article 1 of Schedule II to the Act under which the limitation prescribed is 3 years from the date of dispossession or exclusion from possession. Sections 6 and 7 of the Limitation Act do not apply (see section 104, C. P. Tenancy Act, 1920). THE present suit was clearly instituted beyond 3 years from the date of the transfer.

(3.) THE position seems to be this: (1) A de facto guardian is truly speaking a de facto manager who just has superintendence or supervision over the minor's estate. (2) THE de facto guardian (manager) holds the property of the minor in guasi-trust. If he had continued in management for more than 3 years or 12 years, he could not have set up a title in himself on the ground of adverse possession. (3) Alienation by a de facto manager, which is neither for legal necessity nor for the benefit of the estate, is null and void. (4) THEre is no dispossession, nor exclusion from possession. Article 1, Schedule II to the C. P. Tenancy Act, 1920, is, therefore, not applicable. THE possession of the transferee is merely permissive. (5) This is not to apply section 10 of the Limitation Act, but it is to say that Article 1, Schedule II to the C. P. Tenancy Act, does not govern the present suit. (6) Article 1 of Schedule II to the C. P. Tenancy Act being inapplicable, Article 144 of the Limitation Act governs such a suit and the starting point of limitation is the date on which the de facto manager or his transferee denies the minor's title.