KASHIPRASAD Vs. STATE OF M.P.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by a person, who, on 17th February 1950, entered into an agreement for working certain areas in the Malguzari forest of Goura, Basera, Gouri, Mahgan and Bhandra in Sehora Tehsil with the then proprietor thereof, Raja Harbhagat Singh. On the coming into force of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 the agreement ceased to be operative as against the State. The petitioner's case is that after the enactment of the said Act he approached the State Government for recognizing his licence to work the forest areas as per the agreement concluded between him and Raja Harbhagat Singh on 17th February 1950; that on 5th January 1956 the State Government addressed him a letter saying that they had sanctioned the recognition of the forest lease granted in his favour by Raja Harbhagat Singh; and that thereafter he approached the forest authorities for the marking of the trees in the forest area as stated in the letter of the Government conveying the sanction of the recognition of the lease, but that the forest authorities failed to do so and later on prohibited him from working the forest areas. The petitioner prays that a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ be issued to the opponent restraining them from interfering with his right to work the forest areas leased out to him. The petitioner further prays that necessary direction incidental to the working of the forest areas be also issued to the opponent.

(2.) IN our opinion, this is clearly not a case in which any older or direction can be made under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is now well settled that the remedy provided by Article 226 can be resorted to only for the enforcement of fundamental rights and other legal rights if the petitioner has no other remedy which is equally convenient, beneficial and effective. The petitioner finds his claim on the fact that he had first entered into an agreement with the then proprietor of the forest areas and worked the forest areas for some time till the coming into force of the Act mentioned above, and that thereafter there, came into existence a new contract between him and the State and under that contract he was entitled to work the forest areas free from any interference. It is quite true that the petitioner entered into an agreement with Raja Harbhagat Singh for the working of the forest areas. But the agreement, which created a bare licence, came to an end with the interest of the licensor. Raja Harbhagat Singh, in the forest (see Mahadeo vs. State of Bombay : A. I. R. 1959 SC 735). But the petitioner has not been able to show that thereafter the State entered into an agreen ent with him in the form required by Article 299 for the working of the forest areas. The provisions of Article 299 (1) are mandatory, and if a contract on behalf of the Government does not satisfy the requirements of that article, the contract is not binding on the Government and is unenforceable against it. In Chatturbhuj Vithaldas vs. Moreshwar Parashram : A. I. R. 1954 SC 236, it was observed by the Supreme Court that Article 299 (1) of the Constitution was inserted in the Constitution not for the sake of mere form but for safeguarding the Government against unauthorized contracts, and that if a contract does not satisfy the requirements of Article 299 (1), it is not binding on the Government and is not enforceable against it. Here, admittedly, there was no contract in the form required by Article 299.

(3.) FOR these reasons, this petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee is fixed at Rs. 75. The amount of security, after deducting the costs payable to the respondent, be refunded to the petitioner.