(1.) THE appellant has preferred this appeal under Section 378 of the Criminal Procedure Code feeling aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal dated 16. 2. 2004 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ujjain in Criminal Case No. 3051/2002 whereby acquitted the respondent/accused from the charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to as the N. I. Act for brevity ).
(2.) BRIEF facts of the case are that appellant/complainant has filed a private complaint under Section 138 of the N. I. Act against the respondent/accused with the allegation that respondent/accused has given a cheque of Rs. 6,00,000/- for the discharge of his liability to the complainant on 10. 9. 2002. When this cheque was presented by the complainant in his Bank then the said cheque was returned unpaid with the memo stating that the account holder is not having sufficient money in his Bank account. On receipt of this information, appellant/complainant has issued a statutory notice by registered post with acknowledgement to the respondent/ accused demanding cheque amount within specified period as provided under Section 138 of the N. I. Act, but appellant/accused has not paid any amount of cheque to the complainant. Resultantly, appellant/complainant has filed this complaint under Section 138 of the N. I. Act against the respondent. Respondent/accused appeared before the Trial Court and denied the charge levelled against him. Learned Trial Court, after recording of the complainant's evidence and also of defence witnesses, vide impugned judgment dated 16. 2. 2004 held that the statutory notice as provided under Section 138 of the N. I. Act has not been properly served on the respondent and hence this complaint is not maintainable and thereby acquitted the respondent from the charge under Section 138 of the N. I. Act. Feeling aggrieved by which appellant/complainant has preferred this appeal under Section 378 of the Criminal Procedure Code against the acquittal.
(3.) I have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant as well as Counsel for the respondent and perused the record,