UMASHANKAR CHOUBEY Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner was working in the Vehicle Factory, Jabalpur as a Grinder-B. A criminal case under Sections 396 and 412 of the IPC and under Sections 25, 29 and 30 of the Arms Act was registered against the petitioner in relation to an incident which took place on 29-7-1990 and the petitioner was arrested and taken into custody in connection with the aforesaid case on 8-12-1990. The petitioner was placed under suspension by order dated 8-12-1990 and was paid subsistence allowance during the suspension period. The Fifth Additional Sessions Judge by judgment dated 24-7-1999 delivered in Sessions Trial No. 140/1991 acquitted the petitioner of the charges. On 16-12-1999, the order of suspension was revoked and the petitioner was reinstated in service. The General Manager of the Vehicle Factory, Jabalpur, however refused to treat the period of suspension of the petitioner from 8-12-1990 to 15-12-1999 as period spent on duty and the petitioner was not paid full salary and allowances for the period of suspension. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed O. A. No. 605/2000 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench challenging decision of the General Manager, Vehicle Factory, Jabalpur not to treat the period of suspension as spent on duty and not to pay full salary and allowances for the period of suspension. By order dated 22nd August, 2000, the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench rejected the said OA at the admission stage. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed this writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.

(2.) MR. M. R. Chandra, learned Counsel for the petitioner cited a decision of Central Administrative Tribunal in S. Samson Martin v. Union of India and Ors. 1990 (12) ATC 643, wherein it has been held that whatever the circumstances of acquittal, when the Disciplinary Authority has chosen to suspend on the facts of criminal proceeding only and to wait till the end of the proceeding, it has no discretion in the matter of pay and allowances and it has to abide by the verdict of the Criminal Court. He submits that in this case since the petitioner was placed under suspension on account of the criminal proceedings and the criminal proceedings ended in acquittal, the Disciplinary Authority was bound to treat the period of suspension as spent on duty and pay the petitioner full pay and allowances in accordance with FR 54-B (3 ).

(3.) MR. Jayant Neekhra, learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, cited decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. K. Ponnamma v. State of Kerala and Ors. AIR1997 SC 3660 , JT1997 (4 )SC 322 , (1997 )I LLJ1205 SC , 1997 (3 )SCALE342 , (1997 )9 SCC36 , [1997 ]2 SCR1149 in which the order of the authority after inquiry granting only the suspension allowance and not payment of salary to the petitioner during the period of suspension as per rules has been held by the Supreme Court to be proper. He also relied on decision of the Supreme Court in Ranchodji Chaturji Thakore v. The Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar (Gujarat) and Anr. in support of his contention that the petitioner was not entitled to full pay and allowance during the period of suspension.