G P BHARGAWA Vs. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A. K. Patnaik, C. J. 1. This is an appeal against the order dated 8-3-2006 passed by the learned Single Judge in W. P. No. 3376/2006 (S ).

(2.) THE facts briefly are that the appellant was posted as Chief Municipal Officer, Nagar Panchayat, Sohagpur, in District Hoshangabad since July, 2004. The Collector, Hoshangabad, submitted a report to the State Government alleging various acts of misconduct committed by the appellant and recommending that he be placed under suspension. Thereafter, the State Government placed the appellant under suspension by order dated 23-2-2006. Aggrieved by the said order of suspension, the appellant filed the aforesaid writ petition but by order dated 8-3-2006 the learned Single Judge dismissed the said writ petition. Aggrieved by the said order dated 8-3-2006 of the learned Single Judge, the appellant has filed this appeal.

(3.) MR. Shroti, learned Counsel for the appellant, submitted that Rule 36 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Services (Executive) Rules, 1973 (in short, "the Rules") provides that if having regard to the nature of charges and the circumstances in any case, the Appointing Authority is satisfied that it is necessary or desirable to place, under suspension a member of the service against whom disciplinary proceedings is contemplated or is pending, it may pass an order placing him under suspension. He submitted that the order of suspension dated 23-2-2006 would show that the Appointing Authority has not applied its mind to the nature of the charges and the circumstances of the case and has also not recorded its satisfaction that it is necessary or desirable to place the appellant under suspension and has also not stated that disciplinary proceedings against him are contemplated or pending. He vehemently submitted that the impugned order of suspension is therefore, liable to be quashed, as it does not satisfy the statutory requirements of Rule 36 of the Rules. He cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Indian Nut Products and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. JT1994 (4 )SC 66 , 1994 (2 )KLT598 (SC ), 1994 (2 )SCALE905 , (1994 )4 SCC269 , [1994 ]3 SCR1023 , in support of his submission that the order of suspension should itself record the satisfaction of the conditions and requirements of the statutory provision in Rule 36 of the Rules. He also relied on the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in Indian Nut Products and others (supra), for the proposition that if statute requires an authority to exercise power, when such authority is satisfied that conditions exist for exercise of that power, the satisfaction has to be based on the existence of grounds mentioned therein and such grounds must be made out on the basis of the relevant material and if the existence of the conditions required for the exercise of the power is challenged, the Courts are entitled to examine whether those conditions existed when the order was made in exercise of their power of judicial review. Mr. Shroti also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Bimal Kumar Mohanty AIR1994 SC 2296 , [1994 (68 )FLR970 ], JT1994 (2 )SC 51 , (1995 )I LLJ568 SC , 1994 (1 )SCALE685 , (1994 )4 SCC126 , [1994 ]2 SCR51 , 1994 (2 )SLJ72 (SC ), 1994 (1 )UJ665 (SC ) and in particular Para 12 of the said decision in which it has been held that the Appointing Authority or the Disciplinary Authority when it seeks to suspend an employee pending enquiry or contemplated enquiry, the order of suspension should be passed after taking into consideration the gravity of the misconduct sought to be inquired into or investigated and the nature of the evidence placed before the Appointing Authority and that the order of suspension should not be an administrative routine or an automatic order to suspend an employee but must be based on all relevant aspects and in particular the aspect as to whether it is expedient to keep an employee under suspension pending the enquiry. He submitted that the learned Single Judge has not considered the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Slate of Orissa (supra), in its proper perspective and has summarily dismissed the writ petition of the petitioner.