STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH Vs. SAUD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Accused 2 to 7 (respondents 2 to 7) were tried for offences punishable under Sections 147, 450 and 323 I.P.C. and the first respondent (first accused) was tried for offences punishable under Sections 307 and 148 I.P.C. The Sessions Court acquitted them. The de-facto complainant (PW 5) has filed revision. State has filed appeal against acquittal. De-facto complainant PW 5 and the accused have today tiled a petition setting out that they have settled the dispute and praying for confirming the acquittal and for grant of permission for compounding the offences. Offences under Sections 147, 148, 450 and 307 I.P.C. are non-compoundable and the question of Court granting permission to compound does not arise. Learned Counsel for the respondents have placed reliance on a decision of the learned Single Judge reported in Natthu Khan v. State of M.P., where relying on the decision in Mahesh Chand and another v. State of Rajasthan, learned Single Judge accorded permission to compound offence under Section 326 I.P.C. holding that offence under Section 307 I.P.C. has not been made out.

(2.) In Mahesh ChandTs case, the Supreme Court as a matter of fact accorded permission to compound offence punishable under Section 307 I.P.C. The fact that the Supreme Court has done so is no reason to hold that the High Court has jurisdiction to do so. Supreme Court may have plenary jurisdiction to pass such orders as are deemed fit in the interest of justice.

(3.) The Supreme Court in Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, considered the powers of the Supreme Court under Art. 142 of the Constitution in the face of limitation on the power of terminating pending proceedings under Section 320 or 321 or 482 Cr. P.C. It is observed in paragraph 43 as follows: We agree with Shri Nariman that the power of the Court under Art. 142 insofar as quashing of criminal proceedings arO concerned is not exhausted by Section 320 or 321 or 482 Cr. P.C. or an of them put together. The power under Art. 142 is at an entirely different level and of a different quality. Prohibitions or limitations or provisions contained in ordinary laws cannot, ipso facro, act as prohibitions or limitations on the constitutional powers under Art. 142. Such prohibitions or limitations in the statute of the authority or the Court on which conferment of powers limited in some appropriate way is contemplated. The limitations may not necessarily reflect or be based on any fundamental considerations of public policy. It will again be wholly incorrect to say that powers under Art. 142 are subject to such express statutory prohibitions. That would convey the idea that statutory provisions override a constitutional provision. Perhaps, the proper way of expressing the idea is that in exercising powers under Art. 142 and in assessing the needs of Tcomplete justice of a cause or matter, the Apex Court will take note of the express prohibitions in any substantive statutory provision based on some fundamental principles of public policy and regulate the exercise of its power and discretion accordingly. The proposition does not relate to the powers of the Court under Art. 142, but only to what is or is not Tcomplete justice of a cause or matter and in the ultimate analysis of the propriety of the exercise of the power. No question of lack of jurisdiction or of nullity can arise.