INCOME TAX OFFICER Vs. KALURAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a petition filed by the petitioner under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, against the order dated August 10, 1983, passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Indore, in Criminal Case No. 1075 of 1980, whereby the respondent has been discharged. In the alternative it is also prayed that if the impugned order is treated to be an acquittal, then the petitioner be granted leave under Section 378, Criminal Procedure Code, to prefer an appeal against the acquittal of the respondent.

(2.) THE facts giving rise to this petition may be stated, in brief, thus : THE petitioner, who is an Income-tax Officer, in the capacity of a public servant, after obtaining the necessary sanction, filed a criminal complaint under Section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code, against the respondent, who is an income-tax assessee, for an offence under Section 420 read with Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 277 of the Income-tax Act on the ground that for the assessment years 1965-66 and 1966-67, the respondent had submitted false returns by concealing certain income which was assessable to tax. THErefore, for income escaping assessment, action was taken against the respondent by issuing notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act. Thus, the respondent had submitted false returns with an intent to deceive and defraud the Income-tax Department and to secure a favourable order of assessment.

(3.) THE learned counsel for the petitioner did not dispute the fact that the learned trial court had given several opportunities to the petitioner to lead evidence before charge but no evidence was led. However, he submitted that despite there being no evidence adduced by the petitioner, when the trial court permitted the respondent to produce in evidence Ex. D-1 on which it relied, the necessary inference to be drawn from the impugned order is that the respondent has been acquitted even though no charge was framed against him. But, I am not persuaded to agree with the submission because the acquittal is only after regular trial in which the evidence is adduced after a charge is framed. This is not a case of acquittal. THErefore, merely because the respondent had filed a copy of the judgment of the Income-tax Tribunal, it would not lead to the conclusion that the effect of the impugned order is acquittal of the respondent. In fact, it is a clear order of discharge against which the petitioner ought to have filed a revision which is admittedly barred by 61 days. When the petitioner had a specific remedy of revision to which he did not resort, the inherent power under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, cannot be exercised. THErefore, this petition deserves to be dismissed on the short ground that no revision having been filed within time, this is not a fit case to exercise the inherent power. Even if it is treated as a revision, it is barred by limitation by 61 days for which no application for condonation under the Limitation Act has been filed. This being not a case of acquittal, granting of leave also does not arise.