UNION OF INDIA Vs. YASHWANT SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal is directed against an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and the Appellant before me is the Union of India, because one of the vehicles of the Appellant met with an accident in the course of which the claimant -Respondent sustained grave injuries resulting in fracture of right shoulder joint. At the relevant time, admitted facts of the case are that, the Respondent was working as Time -Keeper in the J.C. Mils and he has been compensated on different counts by the award passed for a total amount of Rs. 25,062.75.

(2.) BEFORE me as it is a First Appeal, the counsel took me through the evidence. Statements on which counsel relies are those of the claimant himself and his witness, Laxmishankar Pandey. Appellant's counsel, Mr. Mittal, has, in forcefully arguing Appellant's case, placed implicit reliance on few statements; which he read out to me, from the evidence of the claimant, recorded in paragraphs 12 and 15, which are as follows:

(3.) MR . Haswani does not dispute that in this case no deduction for lump sum payment has been made by the Tribunal. It is his submission that as an absolute proposition of law the courts have not laid down anywhere that for all times to come the deduction should be fixed at 10%. Indeed, Mr. Haswani submits that in the last 20 years the value of rupee has been slashed by more than 25% and as such the old decisions have no relevancy in so far as the rate of deduction for lump sum payment is concerned. His argument has appealed to me because I must take a reasonable view of the realities of the life. Law to be just and relevant must meet challenge of changing times. Slump in money value must obviously reflect in proportionate lowering of what may be called 'credit value' in terms of the economics of creditworthiness. Indeed, a millionaire ten years ago must be a billionaire today to maintain his creditworthiness and of what importance is lump sum payment if not to increase the creditworthiness of the recipient of the awarded amount. Otherwise, for subsistence and survival not lump sum, but recurring payment, would be of greater value equally to all classes of fully or partially disabled or destitute persons - -a damsel in distress, an orphan, toddler or an aged person or an infirm, mostly for loss of total dependency, but otherwise also. That apart such deduction has to be viewed as a rebate and ought to be made conditional upon lump sum payment being actually made to discharge fully the liability under the award. Even if, due to judicial intervention, payment is delayed in any case, the benefit of rebate should be deemed to have been denied or even waived. Accordingly, although I hold that the award of the Tribunal is erroneous in this respect, it can be modified by a direction that whatever amount is awarded by this Court, on a computation made on different counts of the claim, the total awarded amount shall be subject to a deduction for lump sum payment, indeed at the rate of 5% only.