AJAB SINGH GHASIRAM Vs. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) DEPUTY Government Advocate, Shri Roman, submits that this case is not ripe for any relief. According to State Counsel the petitioner not having made any application for his release on probation in accordance with provisions of Madhya Pradesh Prisoners Release on Probation rules, 1964, (for short the Rules), the State has not defaulted in any manner in discharging its statutory duty or responsibility so as to warrant any direction from this Court. However, we propose to take a different view in this matter, although this jail petition has no support of oral arguments.

(2.) THIS position is not denied that the petitioner has suffered incarceration which, considering remissions, has exceeded 10 years, as claimed. That being the position Rule 4 of the Rules is attracted and in our view a direction in this case is warranted. In our view, there is a duty inscribed in Rule 6 of the Rules by which the Superintendent of Prisons is required to supply free-of charge to prisoners, application forms, for making prayer for release on probation and this has to be done without the prisoner asking for it, in cases where the primary eligibility condition contemplated under Rule 4 is fulfilled. This is not done in this case is also not denied, and indeed, the. contention is that the prisoner has to ask for the application form and make prayer for release on probation. Our view of the law is that Rule 6 does not contemplate this. We extract Clause (1) of Rule 6 of the Rule.-

(3.) IT is true that after the form is supplied by the Superintendent of prisons, if the prisoner chooses not to use his statutory right, the Superintendent of Prisons cannot be faulted. But the duty of the Superintendent of Prisons to supply in the case of the prisoner himself necessary application-form without his asking for it, arises automatically on his satisfying the eligibility-condition contemplated under Rule 4 and in our opinion this is writ large in the provisions of Rule 6 and indeed of section 2 of the parent Act itself which contemplates rehabilitation and reintegration in the society of the prisoner by his prenature release on probation. We say this for the simple reason that the prisoner, who is not aware of his right thereunder, or even otherwise disabled lacking legal counsel, has to be aided by the Executive in the exercise of the right which the legislature has granted to him. This is the requirement of prison justice which conforms to the mandate of Articles 21 and 39-A of the Constitution. We do not have to refer to the whole conspectus of decisions of the Apex Court wherein several aspects of prison justice are vocally projected though reference may yet be made to M. H. Hoskot's, AIR 1980 SC 1548 case, Sunil Batra's, AIR 1980 SC 1579 case and Sheela Barse, AIR 1983 SC 378. The right to 'legal aid' contemplated under Artile 39-A of the Constitution, in the context of Art. 21, in our opinion, contemplates the right to be aided in the redressal of just grievance of any handicapped citizen and it is the duty of the State to aid the prisoner, therefore, to provide him access to the 'justice of the law' even without the intervention of this court. We may appositely refer in this connection to the division Bench decision of the Gauhati High Court in Phusu Koiri, 1985 1 GLR (NOC) 18 to which one of us (Dr. T. N. Singh J.) was a party, wherein it was held 'that the very fact of incarceration deprived the prisoner of his freedom of decision and action' and article 21 burdened the State with the duty of satisfying the Court that for any act of ommission or commission on its part, any statutory right, available to the prisoner, was not denied to him. We accept the law propounded and in our own add that it is this Court's duty to see that the beneficent legislature measure is not frustrated, remaining unenforced. We must see that the 'just legal system' envisaged under Article 39-A is duly and truly ordained as prisoners too cannot be denied benevolent succour of social justice.