BIJLEE KARMACHARI SANGH Vs. M P ELECTRICITY BOARD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, filed by the Bijlee Karmachari Sangh (hereinafter referred to as the Sangh), a registered union, registered as such with the Registrar of Trade Unions, Madhya Pradesh, and by one Ramchandra Joshi, a Trade Union worker, seeking a writ of Mandamus from this court against respondent No. 1, the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) to abolish the discrimination between the regular employees and the Nominal Muster Roll employees (for short, the N. M. R. Employees) or daily wage employees at present in vogue and to classify all its employees strictly in accordance with the Standard Standing Orders.

(2.) A welfare State, claiming to be wedded with the principle of social justice, has to be approached with such a petition, is itself an abundant proof of the reality which exists and the claims that are advanced. The facts as narrated in the petition are as fair from the goal of social justice as shadow is from the substance and illusion is from reality. It is not merely the legalism involved in this petition, but also the very spirit of our Constitution which seeks to achieve justice, social, economical and political to the teeming millions of our country. If the prominently printed words in the preamble of the constitution have to be translated into reality, there can hardly be any opposition to the petition. But, it is a travesty that the respondent-State of Madhya Pradesh has come out with a laconic return-a tacit denial with dexterity of draftsmanship-seeking shelter behind appointment of a Central Wage Board for Electricity undertakings appointed by the Government of India as back as in 1966 and further adding advancing alibi with denial of connivance at the open violation of the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh industrial Relations Act as well as the Standard Standing Orders, framed thereunder. It is to be noted that this denial is not based on the applicability of these Orders and the m. P. Industrial Relations Act, but on their construction, which the respondent-State has chosen to construe in a self-serving manner, quite denuded of the goal envisaged by the Constitution.

(3.) BE tore proceeding any further it would be in the fitness of things to meet the denial advanced by the respondent-State. Section 3 of the M. P. Industrial Relations act, 1960 provides for appointment of a Commissioner of Labour and S. 7 of the Act confers on him with powers of supervision over his subordinates, which include the deputy Commissioner of Labour, the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, the Labour officer and the Deputy Labour Officers. Section 30 enumerates the powers and duties of Labour Officers. Can an authority exercising such wide powers under the Act be so oblivious of the working conditions of such a large number of labourers, by whatever nomenclature they be termed, and can respondents 2 and 3 escape their share of liability in the matter by merely raising a plea of construction of the provisions of the M. P. Industrial Relations Act and the Standard Standing Orders, framed thereunder. Can such authorities plead ignorance of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in such matters. These are some of the moot questions, which the respondent-State is called upon to answer. By mere saying that the subject-matter of the petition precisely pertains to respondent No. 1 the Board can the respondent-State absolve itself of its duty enjoined by law and by the Constitution. If the return filed by the respondents 2 and 3 is an indication, the answer to the question posed, appears to be disappointing.