GOKULCHAND Vs. KRISHNACHANDRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The short, though ticklish question involved in this appeal is whether the landlord is entitled to a decree for eviction of the tenant on the ground of his composite heed i.e. both residential and non-residential by combining clauses (e) and (f) of sub section (1) of section 12 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, (hereinafter referred to as the M. P. Act) where the accommodation is let out for a composite purpose i.e. both residential and non-residential, the lease being single and not two distinct leases

(2.) The plaintiff Krishanchandra has pleaded that a single lease was granted to the defendants, who are real brothers and the suit accommodation was let out both for residential and non-residential purposes i.e. a composite purpose. He further alleges a similar composite need of his own and it is on this ground that a decree for eviction is sought from the suit accommodation. It is thus clear that on the plains averments, the accommodation was let for the composite purpose and the landlord's need set up is similarly composite in nature. The defendants in reply pleaded that the accommodation was let out primarily for a non residential purpose. However, there is a further plea that the purpose of kiting and the need of the landlord being both composite according to the plaintiff's own case, no decree for eviction could be passed either on the ground under clause (e) or (f) issue No. 7 was framed by the trial Court to cover this defence plea i.e. whether the lease being for a composite purpose, the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for eviction either under clause (e) or (f) of sub-section (I) of section 12 of the M. P. Act .

(3.) The trial court omitted to record any finding on the aforesaid issue No. 7 but it decreed the suit without adverting to this question. On appeal by Gokulchand, defendant No. 2 alone, the first appellate court has affirmed the decree. It has however, noticed the omission of the trial Court and recorded a finding that the accommodation being let for a composite purpose, a decree for eviction can be passed for the plaintiff's composite need by combining clauses (e) and (f) to form the basis of the decree for eviction. The defendant No. 2 has, therefore, preferred this further appeal. It is on these facts that the aforesaid question arises for determination.