UNION OF INDIA Vs. SUMERCHAND JAIN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, is directed against a judgment and decree dated 5 March 1964 whereby the civil Judge, Class I, Seoni empowered under section 9 of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1958, allowed the non-applicant's claim for Rs. 65, being the value of a parcel of cloth made over to the postal authorities at Seoni for transmission and delivery to the addressee at Sagar, which was mis-delivered.

(2.) IT is not disputed that, on 19 August 1960, a parcel addressed to one Lala Sahib Manikchandji C/o Bhagwandas Shobhalal Jain, Sagar, was registered in the Seoni Post Office, that a receipt No. 181 was issued therefor, that the parcel was wrongly delivered to the Sub Divisional Officer (P. W. D.) B. R., Narsimhapur, on 22 August 1960, that the non-applicant made a complaint to the postal authorities, that the receipt No. 181 was taken away from him for the purpose of the enquiry and that he was informed on 24 September 1960 that the parcel had been mis-delivered. IT is also admitted that a notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was duly served on the applicant.

(3.) IN Union of INdia v. Firm Barn Gopal, AIR 1960 All 672, Dhavan J. was considering cases of value payable parcels. Post Master General, Patna v. Bam Kripal, AIR 1955 Pat 442, there was an insured cover which had been delivered for transmission by post. It is hardly necessary to say that, in such cases, different considerations arise by virtue of other provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder. It is true that, for purposes of delivering postal articles or receiving money payable therefor, the Post Office may be the agent of the sender or the addressee: The Commissioner of INcome-tax, Bombay South, Bombay v. Messrs. Ogale Qlass Works Ltd., Ogale Wadi, AIR 1954 SC 429=(1955) 1 SCR 185 and Commissioner of INcome-tax v. Messrs. P. M. Bathod and Co., AIR 1959 SC 1394, but that is not the same thing as saying that there is, in such cases, a contract between the sender and the Post Office or that the postal service is a common carrier. IN the last-mentioned case, the Supreme Court did not say that, in the matter of transmission of postal articles, the jural relationship is contractual in nature. Having regard to the provisions of the Act, it appears to me that the Post Office is a branch of the public service and the liability for misdelivery of a postal article like the one here can be supported only on the basis of express provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder. As indicated earlier, not only no such provision was shown but section 6 of the Act clearly and expressly exempted the Central Government from liability for what was admittedly a case of misdelivery.