LALJI BHAI KALYANJI Vs. COLLECTOR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner in this case seeks a writ of certiorari for quashing two orders of the Collector, Seoni, made under section 39 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) one, first allotting the ground floor of a house belonging to the applicant to the Divisional Forest Officer, North Division, Seoni, for the purpose of his office and the other allotting the same accommodation subsequently to the District Publicity Assistant, Seoni, for the District Publicity Office.

(2.) THE material facts are that the house in question is a two-floored structure. It has also two out-houses attached to it. THE first floor, two rooms on the ground floor and one outhouse were allotted by the Collector to the Divisional Forest Officer, North Division, Seoni, for the purpose of locating his office. THE applicant had let out the remaining accommodation on the ground floor to Shri Sharma, the then Divisional Forest Officer, North Division, Seoni, for his residence. When Shri Sharma was transferred and was succeeded by Shri Solanki, the latter occupied the accommodation on the ground floor which was vacated by Shri Sharma and which was being used by him for his residence. Shri Solanki, also used the accommodation for his residential purposes. On or about 18th June 1964 Shri Solanki left the accommodation. THEreafter, the petitioner in compliance with an order issued to him by the Collector on 22nd June 1964 under section 39 (1) of the Act informed the Collector, that the accommodation which was in the occupation of Shri Solanki had fallen vacant; that he did not intend to let out the accommodation to anyone as he himself needed it; that the accommodation which was in his occupation was insufficient and un-suitable for the members of his family; that his youngest son had also come from Ugli with his wife and children for residing with him; and that his own wife was suffering from high blood pressure and cardiac asthma.

(3.) IN our judgment, this contention must be accepted. The Accommodation Control Act, 1961, classifies "accommodation" into two categories, namely, residential and non-residential. Section 2 (a) of the Act defines "accommodation" as meaning "any building or part of a building, whether residential or non-residential" and as including land, which is not being used for agricultural purposes, and gardens, garages, outhouses and grounds, if any, appurtenant to the building. The word "residence" has not been defined in the Act. But the ordinary connotation of the word is a "place where a person eats, drinks and sleeps". [See Kishore Chandra v. Ganesh Prasad AIR 1951 SC 316 at p. 320.] The classification of the accommodation in the Act into residential and non-residential purposes is according to the purpose for which the accommodation has been let out to a person. This is manifest from section 12 (1), clauses (e) and (f). Under clause (a), if the accommodation has been let out for residential purposes, then the landlord can evict a tenant on the ground that the accommodation so let out is required bona fide by him "for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in the City or Town concerned." If, on the other hand, the accommodation has been let out for non-residential purposes, then in order to evict the tenant on the ground of his requirement in respect of the accommodation, the landlord must show, as laid down in clause (f), that the accommodation is required bona fide by him "for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the City or Town concerned." Thus, it is the purpose of letting agreed to between the landlord and the tenant that determines the character of letting for the purpose of clauses (e) and (f) of section 12 (1). This agreed purpose of letting cannot be varied either by the tenant or by the landlord unilaterally so as to take away the right of the landlord under clause (e) or clause (f) or affect the protection given to the tenant against ejectment by those clauses. The Act does not in any way control the freedom of the landlord to determine for what purpose he will let out the accommodation. But having let out the accommodation for a specific purpose and the tenant having agreed to take the accommodation for that purpose, the landlord cannot unilaterally change the purpose; nor can the tenant do so.