MISHRA R N Vs. BURN AND CO LTD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS application under Atricles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is by an employee of the Burn and Co. , Ltd. , Niwar, district Jabalpur, (hereinafter called the company), of which the respondent is the works manager. The applicant is also the general secretary of the Burn and Co. Mazdoor Sangh. He seeks a writ of certiorari for quashing the determination of the labour court, Jabalpur, and of the industrial court, Madhya Pradesh, that the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), applies to Burn and Co. Ltd. , Niwar, district Jabalpur, an undertaking styled as "refractory and ceramic works" and engaged in the manufacture of fire-bricks, and, therefore, the labour court has jurisdiction to entertain an application filed by the works manager under Sections 61 (1) (A) and (C) and 80 of the Act for a declaration that the employees of the company had gone on an illegal strike from 1 March 1965. The petitioner also prays that a direction prohibiting the labour court from entertaining and proceeding with the aforesaid application of the respondent be issued.

(2.) SECTIONS 1 and 112 of the Act came into force on 31 December 1960. In regard to other provisions of the Act, Section 1 (3) provides that (3) This section and Section 112 shall come into force at once and the State Government may, by notification, bring all or any of the remaining provisions of this Act into force in respect of

(3.) THE sole question that arises for determination in this case is whether the Burn and Co. , Ltd. , "refractory and Ceramic Works. " Niwar, of which the respondent is the works manager and which is admittedly engaged only in the manufacture of fire-bricks, is an undertaking in the " potteries" industry. The answer to the question depends on the meaning to be given to the word " potteries," as used in the schedule to the notification dated 31 December 1960 issued under Section 1 (3) of the Act. The question of the denotation of the term " potteries " has to be determined bearing in mind the settled rules regarding construction of words and terms used in a statute, and not with reference to technical books or dictionaries alone ignoring the rules of construction. The first rule is that general statutes will prima facie be presumed to use words in their popular sense. As stated by Lord Tenterden in Attorney-General v. Winstanley (1831) 2 D. and Clauses 302, 310 the words of an Act of Parliament which are not applied to any particular science or art "are to be construed " as they are understood in common language. " In the Fusilier (1865) 34 L. J. P. M. and A. 25 at 27 Dr. Lushtngton sald: