BALMUKUND KHAMPARIA Vs. MEERA DEVI KESHWARWANI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) By way of this revision, the petitioner has called into question, order dtd. 15/10/2025, (Annexure P/1), passed by the trial court, whereby the application of the petitioner under order 7 rule 11 CPC has been dismissed.

(2.) Learned counsel for petitioners/ defendants no. 1 and 2 has vehemently argued before this court that the trial court has gravely erred in rejecting the application for rejection of plaint under order 7 rule 11 CPC. It is argued that the suit was not maintainable and the trial court has gravely erred in rejecting the application under order 7 rule 11 CPC. It is contended that the suit has been filed by the plaintiff seeking declaration of title, permanent injunction and cancellation of sale deed dated 24-06- 2025 on the ground that there is an earlier sale deed by the present petitioners in favour of the plaintiff executed in the year 1993. It is argued that the said sale deed was executed in violation of mandatory provisions of Sec. 5(3) of Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act1976 (for short Ceiling Act 1976). It is argued that the said Act of 1976 was enacted by the Parliament and as per Sec. 5(3), any sale, mortgage, gift or transfer in any other manner after commencement of the Act was prohibited and in the present case the transaction took place in the year 1993 and therefore, it was obviously a prohibited transaction and a transaction which was void ab-initio and therefore no suit could have been filed on basis of such a void transaction.

(3.) It is argued that though the defendants No. 1 to 4 may have sold the property to the plaintiff in the year 1993 but the provisions of Sec. 43 for Transfer of Property Act (for short "T.P. Act) would not apply in the present case, even though later on the land was declared freed from ceiling by Collector, District Jabalpur on 23/4/2025 because the concept of feeding the estoppel under Sec. 43 of TP Act would not apply where the same transaction is a void transaction and is void ab-initio in such cases Sec. 23 of Indian Contract Act would apply with full force because it was something which was forbidden by law and therefore, it was not a simplistic case of a person selling the land without any title and subsequently acquiring the title so that Sec. 43 of TP Act would apply, but it was a case where not only title was not available to the vendor but also that the sale had been barred by law. In support of his contentions, counsel for petitioner relies on judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Saurav Jain v. A.B.P. Design, (2022) 18 SCC 633, to submit that feeding the estoppel principle under Sec. 43 of TP Act would not apply in cases of transactions prohibited by law. He further relies on judgment of Supreme Court in Hardev Singh v. Gurmail Singh, (2007) 2 SCC 404, to submit that the person who is entitled to object to invocation of principle of feeding the estoppel is the vendor of the sale deed and no other person, and therefore the petitioners have validly raised the objection which ought to have been sustained by the trial court.