CHATURSINGH Vs. KHEMRAJ SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The present petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been filed by the petitioners being aggrieved by the order dtd. 26/3/2021 passed in Case No.0021/Appeal/2020-21 alongwith its proceedings whereby the learned Sub-Divisional Officer, Morar, District Gwalior without condoning of delay in filing the said had granted the interim relief as under:

(2.) Shri N.K. Gupta - learned Senior Advocate alongwith Shri YPS Rathore - Advocate for the petitioners has argued before this Court that the First Appellate Authority/Sub-Divisional Officer had committed error in not deciding the application for condonotion of delay preferred by the present petitioner No.2 alongwith his appeal under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act and had went on to pass an interim order order dtd. 26/3/2021 whereby the learned Tehsildar of Circle Badagon was directed to open the closed path in Survey No.68 of Village Parampur Kheria till final disposal of the appeal, whereas, it is settled principle of law that without condoning the delay, there is no appeal in existence and no appeal can be heard and the application seeking condonation of delay has to be considered by the Court first.

(3.) While placing reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of reported in Popat Bahiru Govardhane and Others Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer and Another reported in (2013) 10 SCC 765, it was argued that it is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. It was further submitted that the statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same and the legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation, as "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute and a result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.