UMRAO SINGH CHOUDHARY Vs. STATE OF M.P.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner was appointed as Vice -Chancellor of Devi Ahilya Vishwavidyalaya (University) on 5.9.1992 under section 13 of Madhya Pradesh Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1973, for short' Adhiniyam' for a period of four years and he had joined on 17.9.1992. The Governor exercising the power under section 52 (1) of the Adhiniyam issued a notification on 21.1.1994 and by operation thereof the petitioner had ceased to be the Vice -Chancellor with effect from the said date. On 22.1.1994 the petitioner had moved a writ petition in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh to declare the action as mala fide, illegal, arbitrary, impinging his right to continue in office till 17.9.1996 and was violative of principles of natural justice. The Division Bench, by its order dated 21.2.1994, in Misc. Petition No. 125 of 1994 dismissed the petition. Thus, this petition by special leave.

(2.) TWO contentions were raised in the High Court as well as before us that the action of the Governor is administrative and omission to give opportunity to the petitioner is violative of principle of natural justice, apart from being a mala fide exercise of powers by the State Government. Since the Misc. Petition was taken up for hearing at the admission stage, records had been called for by the High Court and were made available by the Government. As stated in the judgment, the High Court felt it expedient to dispose of the case at the hearing stage itself. In those circumstances no counter -affidavit was filed on behalf of the State Government. With a view to satisfy the tenability of the contentions raised vis -a -vis the material made available by the Government in support of the impugned order and to satisfy ourselves independently, we sent for the records and the counsel today placed the records before us. We have carefully gone through the record and also the note said to have been submitted to the Government for consideration before issuing the notification. We have heard the counsel on both sides.

(3.) THOUGH the contention of mala fides has been repeated by the learned Senior Counsel, when we pointed out, that the petitioner had not made any specific allegation against any specified officer or holder of the office, nor impleaded any officer or holder of the office as a party respondent, in fairness, the learned Senior Counsel did not pursue the line of argument. Nonetheless it was contended that the petitioner was entitled to be afforded an opportunity of being heard before passing the impugned notification and the order passed in violation thereof offends the principle of natural justice. We find no force in the contention. Section 14 engrafts an elaborate procedure to conduct an enquiry against the Vice -Chancellor and after giving reasonable opportunity, to take action thereon for his removal from the office. Section 52 engrafts an exception thereto. The condition precedent, however, is that the State Government should be satisfied, obviously on objective consideration of the material relevant to the issue, as on record, that the administration of the University cannot be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Act, without detriment to the interest of the University, and that it is expedient in the interest of the University and for proper administration thereof, to apply in a modified form, excluding the application of Sections 13 and 14, etc. and to issue the notification under section 52(1). By necessary implication, the application of the principle of natural justice has been excluded. In view of this statutory animation the contention that the petitioner is entitled to the notice and an opportunity before taking action under section 52 (1) would be self -defeating. The principle of natural justice does not supplant the law, but supplements the law. Its application may be excluded, either expressly or by necessary implication. Section 52 in juxtaposition to section 14, when considered, the obvious inference would be that the principle of natural justice stands excluded.