R R COMPUTERS Vs. M B AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Petitioner firm entered into a contract for computarised billing of L.I Bills of the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board (for short 'the M.B.) of its Mandsaur Circle on the terms and conditions contained in a letter dated 4.9.90 which is annexed to the petition as Annexure P/9 contained the term that the preparation of L.I Bills should commence within a period of 6 weeks from the date of approval conveyed vide letter dated 29.3.90, failing which the order will automatically lapse the Petitioner's contention is that when the order dated 29.3.90 was itself approved by the M.B. after 5-1/2 months on 4.9.90, the time left was unreasonably short. It was pointed out by the Petitioner-firm to the M.B. that since the order dated 29.3.90 did not contain any details of any input, output, software and hardware which were given only on 4.9.90, it was impossible to complete the work within the few days time which was left. It was contended that the contract could not have been undertaken without extension of time by the M.B. Several requests were made for extension of time but there was no response from the M.B. A long correspondence was exchanged between the parties about the work but ultimately on 27.3.92 the M.B. issued an order to the effect that as the Petitioner has not been able to commence the computarisation of 12 centers of the Garoth Division and to establish within the stipulated period of 3 months from the date of letter dated 16.9.91, the order dated 4.9.90 was deemed to have elapsed without any liabilities on either side. The Petitioners contend that This action is arbitrary and discriminatory and is also in breach of the principles of promissory estoppel as acting on the promise to give the order and extend the time for its performance the Petitioner firm had invested money on purchase of fresh computers and computer accessories. Reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Shrilekha Vidharthee v. State of U.P., 1991 AIR(SC) 537 for the preposition that state actions in contractual matters can also be subjected to judicial review under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. A decision of the Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills v. U.O.I, 1987 AIR(SC) 2414 was relied upon for the preposition that all that is required for applicability of principle of promissory estoppel was that the party asserting the estoppel must have acted upon the assurance given to him and must have relied on the representation made to him. The alteration of the position of the party is the only indespensible requirement of the doctrine. It is not necessary to prove further the damage. Detriment to the party asserting the estoppel.

(2.) The Respondent/M.B. contended that the petition raises disputed questions of fact and was based merely on contractual rights. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for Respondent on the decision of the Supreme Court in Bareli Development Authority v. Ajar Palsingh, 1989 AIR(SC) 1076; Harshankar v. Dy. Exice and Sales tax Commissioner, 1975 AIR(SC) 1121 and M/s. Radha Krishna Aganval v. State of Bihar, 1977 AIR(SC) 1496. In the Bareli Development Authority's case it was observed that when the contract entered into by the state is non-statutory and purely contractual the relations are no longer governed by the Constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines the right and the obligation of the parties inter-se. In this sphere the parties can only claim rights conferred upon them by the contract in the absence of any statutory obligation on the part of the authority in the said contractual field. It is also settled law that no writ or order can be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so as to compel the authorities to remedy the breach of contract pure and simple. In Harshankar's case in paras 21 and 22 it was observed that a writ petition is not an appropriate remedy for impeaching contractual obligations. The writ jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligations voluntarily incurred. In Radhakrishna Agrawal's case it was observed that if the state or its agents have entered into the field of ordinary contract, the relations shall no longer be governed by the Constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines the rights and obligations of the parties inter-set No question arises of violation of Article 14 or any other Constitutional provisions when the state or its agent purporting to act within this field perform any act. In this sphere, they can only claim rights conferred upon them by contract and are bound by the terms of the contract only unless some statute steps in and confers some special statutory power or obligation on the state in the contractual field which is part of contract.

(3.) Having heard the learned Counsel and having perused the record as also having gone through the aforesaid case law, we are of the opinion that this petition raises a purely contractual dispute and, therefore, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not the proper remedy. Moreover, the question of promissory estoppel can also not be decided without first deciding the disputed questions of fact as to whether any promise was held out and as to whether the Petitioners acting on that promise had altered their position to their detriment. The petition therefore, cannot be entertained. It is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.