(1.) EVEN after affording sufficient opportunity the respondents have not filed any return and, therefore, the case has to be disposed of on the basis of petitioner's pleadings.
(2.) PETITIONER 's learned counsel submitted that in view of Amir Shed Khan v. D. Hamingliana (AIR 1991 SC 1983) the respondents were obliged to inform the detenu of his right to make a representation to specified authorities to enable him to submit his representation at the earliest opportunity and the State Government was further obliged before passing the impugned order to have taken into consideration the representation made by the detenue before the Advisory Board. Since these legal requirements were not complied with by the respondents the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. On facts it was argued that out of the twelve criminal cases covered under the first information reports filed with the ground of detention in Annexure -D no specific act has been attributed to the detenu and Annexures - F, I and O the name of the detenu does not figure. It is not clear as to how these documents have been relied upon as furnishing grounds for his detention. It was then submitted that the first alleged offence committed in the 1989 is said to be under sections 448 and 294 I.P.C. and, therefore, is a simple in faction of the criminal law which could have no nexus with the alleged disturbance of public order which alone can furnish valid ground for detention under the said Act. The said ground is also assailed as being stale because thereafter for a year there is no allegation of any criminal activity on the part of the detenu. Summing up the learned counsel stated that even if viewed cumulatively all these alleged criminal cases will only amount to instances of breach of law and order for which the extra -ordinary provisions, of\he said Act cannot legitimately be invoked. Since no return has been filed, the criticism of legal infirmity could not be replied to by the learned Deputy Advocate General. His submission is that the first information reports in Annexures -F, I and O relate to disturbance of public order in the sense that the detenu had resorted to violence not against any particular individual but against the society as such by exploading bombs in public places with a view to create terror. Be that as it may, considering the legal infirmity pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, we conclude that the impugned orders of detention are not sustainable. The order passed by the District Magistrate has merged in the order of the State Government.