NOHAR PRASAD BUDHUK Vs. STATE OF M P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question that arises in this appeal is whether the trial Judge was right in holding that prosecutrix Munnibai was not a consenting party. The appellant was tried on charge under section 376 IPC for having committed forcible sexual intercourse with Munnibai on 14.10.1984 in a Tuar field of village Piparmati, Police Station Kunda, Dislrict Bilaspur. Munnibai was a married woman. In fact she was living with her second husband as she never joined the first one. She was above 16 and on the date of incident had been to the field where her father-in-law and husband were at work. When she was returning back home to get some more seeds she was caught by the appellant on way, taken to a nearby Tuar field and forcibly violate. Her cries are said to have attracted Sevaram (P.W. 2), Ramdas (P.W.4) and Jannu (P.W. 3). When these persons reached the scene of occurrence the appellant ran away and the prosecutrix also ran away from there and instead of joining her husband or father-in-law who were working in nearby fields she went to her maternal uncles place in a different village. The next day she returned back and the first information report Ex.P. 1 was lodged. The doctor who examined her did not find any injury on her person. The learned trial Judge held the procutrix as also P.Ws.2 and 4 reliable and rejected the defence plea of consent but instead of convicting the appellant under section 376 IPC, he convicted him u/s. 376 read with 511 IPC and sentenced him to three yearsT R.I., vide judgment dated 31.3.1986. in S.T. No. 12 of 1985 of Bilaspur Sessions Division.

(2.) Appellants learned counsel submitted that the circumstances taken as a whole unmistakably show that Munnibai was a consenting party. Elaborating he said that the most important fact in this behalf is her strange conduct in running away from the scene of occurrence not to join her husband but to distant herself from him. As three persons had come on the scene of occurrence, her explanation that she ran away to her maternal uncleTs place in different village on account of fright is only to be stated to be rejected. In presence of those witnesses she had absolutely no reason to be so frightened as to have the village more so when her father-in-law and husband were working in nearby fields. Then it is noteworthy that although she claims that she had received injuries on her elbow and other parts of the body, the doctor who examined her did not find any such injury. The evidence of P.Ws.2 and 4 is also not reliable as P.W. 2 had only stated in case-diary statement that he went there hearing some sound and not because he had overheard the alarm raised by a probably victim of rape. Out of the three witnesses P. W. 3 turned hostile. The explanation given by Munnibai that the appellant had threatened her at the point of knife to leave the village is totally false because when a number of persons had come on the scene of occurrence the appellant must have ran away abroad and there was no question of any such threat being administered by him before he left the place. The evidence clearly shows that the appellant was residing just in front of the house of Munnibai yet she has tried to feign that she did not know him and had not seen him before the incident.

(3.) Taking the aforesaid circumstances collectively it appears to be a case of consent and the learned trial Judge went wrong in holding otherwise. In result the appeal is allowed, appellants conviction and sentence as aforesaid are hereby set aside and he is acquitted of the charge. Appeal allowed.