LAWS(MPH)-1994-8-63

RAGHUBIR SINGH Vs. SURJIT SINGH

Decided On August 22, 1994
RAGHUBIR SINGH Appellant
V/S
SURJIT SINGH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) PURSUANT to the notification to elect a Member for the Punjab Vidhan Sabha to represent the Giddarbha Assembly Constituency, the appellant Raghubir Singh filed his nomination on 1.2.1992 which was found valid in the scrutiny on 2.2.1992, and he contested the election held on 19.2.1992 wherein he was declared only elected on 20.2.1992. Thereafter, the respondent Surjit Singh, voter from that constituency filed an Election Petition for a declaration that the appellants election was void on the ground that he was disqualified to be a candidate at the time of election. The facts on which this ground is based are admitted.

(2.) THE appellant was convicted for an offence punishable under section 326 read with section 149 I.P.C. and sentenced to three years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 100/ - in addition to his conviction and sentence also under some other sections of the Indian Penal Code, by the Trial Court on 15.11.1984. The appellants appeal against his conviction and sentence was dismissed by the High Court on 10.4.1987 and the special leave petition against the same was rejected by this Court on 30.11.1987. The appellant was in jail to serve out his sentence from 8.9.1987 to 21.10.1987 and again from 8.2.1988 to 14.11.1989. There is no dispute that in accordance with the plain language of sub -section (3) of section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as "the R.P. Act"), the appellant was disqualified to be a candidate at the said election held in February 1992 on this ground alone. The High Court has upheld this contention of the respondent -election petitioner and allowed the election petition declaring the appellant's said election to be void. Hence, this appeal under section 116A of the R.P. Act.

(3.) THE submission of Shri R.K. Jain, learned counsel for the appellant is that the period of disqualification in sub -section (1) of section 8 being only six years from the date of such conviction, the longer period of disqualification prescribed in sub -section (3) thereof extending to six years since his release is discriminatory. The submission is that the period of disqualification in sub -section (3) should also be read as six years from the date of such conviction and not the longer period extending to six years from the date of release. In short, the submission is that the period of disqualification in sub -sections (1), (2) and (3) of section X should be identical and there is no rational basis for providing a different period of disqualification in the different sub -sections of section 8. We are unable to accept this argument.