DEVENDRA KUMAR Vs. KAMTA PRASAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) "If the tenant is willing to go out I do not see why any order is wanted." This is what was stated by Lord Scrutton, L.J., in Barton v. Finchman, 1921 (2) KB 291. In this case the tenant wanted to go. He entered into a compromise in the year 1981. He changed his mind. He took technical objections and was successful. The compromise decree remained unexecuted. The hopes of the landlord to seek speedy and peaceful possession of the house became a mirage. This is how this petition came to be filed in this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This arises out of the following facts.

(2.) THE petitioner filed a suit for eviction. This was based on the ground that the respondent No. 1, tenant has already built a new house in Ward No. 23 of the city of Vidisha and that the tenant was also in arrears of rent. Thus, eviction was sought on the twin grounds mentioned in section 12 (1) (a) and (f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'. Written statement was filed and issues were also framed. However, a compromise was arrived at and it was specifically mentioned that the respondent-tenant would vacate the premises on 31st December 1984. It was also agreed that he would hand over the vacant possession to the petitioner. It was further mentioned as a fact that the respondent tenant would shift to his house bearing No. 18 in Ward No. 23. It was also stipulated in the compromise that the tenant would pay Rs. 10/- for use and occupation of the premises. The statements of parties were recorded on 28th July 1981 and 1st of August, 1981, and order of eviction based on compromise was passed.

(3.) THE question as to whether a compromise decree passed under the Rent Laws can be executed, has been examined by the Supreme Court of India from time to time. Thus, in Bahadursing v. Muni Subrat Das, 1969 RCR 151 (SC) : 1969 (2) SCR 432, a decree for eviction passed on the basis of a compromise between the parties was held to be a nullity by the Supreme Court of India. This decree was passed under section 30(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. The decree was held to be a nullity because the landlord was not a party thereto and also because the court had not satisfied itself that a ground for eviction as required by the statute existed. The above decision can be said to be an authority for the proposition that a Court ordering eviction has to satisfy itself that a statutory ground for eviction has been made out by a landlord. Again, in Kaushalya Devi v. K.L. Bansal, 1969 RCR 703 (SC) : AIR 1970 SC 838 the same question arose under the same Act. The eviction was sought on two grounds namely - (i) that the premises were required for personal use and (ii) the tenant had committed default in payment of rent. Both the grounds were refuted by the tenant. Later on a compromise was arrived at. The decree was held to be a nullity because the manner in which the court's satisfaction existed was not apparent from the compromise order.