GAJRA GEARS DEWAS Vs. PRESIDENT DEWAS MUNICIPALITY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of india, the petitioners challenge the demand for levy of octroi duty in pursuance of the notification, dated 28-6-1963 (Petitioner's Annexure-A) extending the limits of the Dewas Municipality in exercise of powers under section 5 (4) (b)of the M. P. Municipalities Act, 1961. According to the petitioners, the octroi duty could not be demanded unless it was imposed and levied as contemplated by section 129 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961. The other contention, raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the exemption having been granted by the State Government on different occasions, the respondents are not entitled to recover the octroi duty, which had been specifically exempted by the State Government in exercise of powers conferred by section 132 of the m. P. Municipalities Act, 1961. These are the two main points involved in the present case.

(2.) THE facts leading to the filing of the present writ petition are as follows: The industrial area where the petitioner concern is located was not within the limits of the Dewas Municipality. The petitioner started its concern as a small scale unit in the month of May, 1962. Bv notification, dated 28-6-1963 (Petitioner's Annexure-A), the industrial area was included within the municipal limits. But, even so, there was no notification that all taxes in force in the Municipal area would be applicable to the extended area newly included within the Municipal limits.

(3.) THE State Government in exercise of powers conferred by section 132 of the M. P. Municipalities Act, 1961, issued the notification No. 124-11694-XVIII-U, dated 12th July, 1963 (Respondent's Annexure-IV, to be found at p. 99 of the paper-book) published in the M. P. Gazette, dated 26th July, 1963, Part II at page 558, issued an order exempting the small scale units from payment of octroi duty for a period of five years from the date the industrial unit would go into production. But the exemption was to cease in any case on 31-3-1971. It is not disputed that the petitioner was entitled to exemption under this notification for a period of five years from the date it went into production, but, in no case, that exemption was to last beyond 31-3 1971.