SHIVRAM BAKSHI Vs. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents 1 to 3 to put the petitioner in vacant possession of House No. 287, Napier Town, Jabalpur.

(2.) THE facts are that the petitioner Shivram Bakshi was the tenant of House No. 287 and Smt. Chhabrani Bahu and Smt. Chandrani Bahu were the owners of the house in 1969 when it was requisitioned under Section 5 of the Madhya Pradesh accommodation (Requisition) Act, 1948. The order of requisition which was passed on 11th June, 1969 (Annexure P-1) directed Chhabrani Bahu and Chandrani Bahu, the owners, and Shivram Bakshi, the occupant, to deliver possession of the house to the Rent Controlling Authority. The house was taken possession of by this order of requisition. On 15th March, 1972 the Government decided to de-requisition the house and to requisition another house bearing No. 315. It appears that House No. 315 belongs to the petitioner Bakshi and he applied to the Government that his house may be requisitioned and House No. 287 be derequisitioned. By the order dated 15th March, 1972, it seems, this proposal of Bakshi was accepted by the government and the Collector was directed to take necessary action. As the collector did not put Bakshi in possession of House No. 287, this writ petition was filed for commanding the State Government, the Collector and the Rent Controlling authority to put the petitioner in possession of the said house. Smt. Prem Kaur, who is impleaded as respondent No. 4, appears to be the successor-in-interest of the original owners, namely, Chhabrani Bahu and Chandrani Bahu. The stand taken by Prem Kaur in her return is that the petitioner's tenancy came to an end on requisition, but it is not disputed that he was the tenant at the time when the house was requisitioned. In the return filed on behalf of the State Government and the Collector it is contended that the petitioner's tenancy came to an end because of the requisition as he was paid compensation under the Act and possession of the house cannot be given to him. It is also contended that possession can be delivered to such person as may be found entitled after enquiry, but in no case can a tenant be placed in possession on derequisition.

(3.) THE stand taken by the respondents that on requisition of the house the tenancy of the occupant is brought to an end is entirely erroneous. The word "requisition" is very often used in contradistinction to acquisition of property by which interest in the property gets transferred from the individual to the State. In case of requisition, no interest in the property is acquired by the State and the property is merely taken out of the control of the persons who have interest in the property. By a requisition order, therefore, the State merely takes possession of the property and does not deprive the owner or tenant of the interest held by them in the property; (Maggilal v. State of M. P. , AIR 1955 Nag 153 ). The compensation that is payable to an owner or a tenant under the Requisition Act is paid for temporary deprivation of the enjoyment of the property requisitioned. The compensation is not paid for the transfer of the rights of ownership or of the leasehold rights, because these rights are not taken over by the State. A look at Section 4 (2-A) of the Act will show that compensation payable to a tenant is merely nominal. A monthly tenant is paid only one month's rent as compensation. If the tenancy is from year to year or for a fixed term not exceeding one year, the tenant is paid only two months' rent as compensation. Again, where the tenancy is for a term exceeding one year, the compensation payable is only three months' rent. Thus, even if the tenant has a 99 years lease or a perpetual lease, he would be paid only three months' rent as compensation for the requisition. The nominal amount of compensation provided in the Act itself shows that the requisition order does not terminate the lease and the leasehold rights are not taken over by the state; the tenant is compensated only for disturbance of possession or temporary deprivation of possession.