JAYANTI MISHRA Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS order shall also govern the disposal of Misc. Petition No. 347 of 1973.

(2.) THE facts giving rise to these petitions are that certain area in village Bheraghat. District Jabalpur, which was previously under a mining lease was made available for regrant by a notification issued under Rule 58 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, which was published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazettee dated 15th August 1969. The relevant part of the notification reads as follows: M/s. Jailal Bharatlal, a partnership firm, made an application for mining lease of this area on 14th September 1969 to the Collector, Jabalpur. Smt. Jayanti Mishra (petitioner in M. P. No. 120 of 1973) and M/s. Madhya Pradesh Lime Works (petitioner in M. P. No. 347 of 1973) also filed applications for grant of mining lease on 16th September 1969. These applications were considered by the State Government. The application of M/s. Jailal Bharatial was rejected on the ground that it was premature. Out of the remaining two applicants. Smt. Jayanti Mishra was preferred on the ground that she was a more suitable party and her application was allowed. Against the order of the State Government M/s. Jailal Bharatial as also M/s. Madhya Pradesh Lime Works went up in revision to the Central Government under Rule 54 of the Mineral Concession Rules. The Central Government held that the application for mining lease made by M/s. Jailal Bharatial was not premature, and that it being prior in time to the other applications, M/s. Jailal Bharatial were entitled to the grant of mining lease. On this finding, the revision filed by M/s. Jailal Bharatial was allowed and the State Government was directed to grant the mining lease to the said firm. It is against this order that these two writ petitions have been filed in this Court; one by Smt. Jayanti Mishra and the other by M/s. Madhya Pradesh Lime Works.

(3.) A perusal of the aforesaid rule will show that it requires that the data from which the area is to be made available for grant be notified in the Official Gazette "at least thirty days in advance." The meaning of the words "at least thirty days in advance", in our opinion, is that thirty clear days must intervene between the date of publication of notification and the date from which the area becomes available for grant. In other words, thirty days have to be counted exclusive of the day on which notification is issued in the Gazette and of the day from which the area becomes available for grant. Our conclusion sets support from the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in R. v. Long, (1959) 3 All ER 559. In this case S.23 (1) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, which required notice of intention to prove previous convictions to be given to the offender "at least three days before the trial", came up for consideration and it was held that these words meant a period of three clear days exclusive of the day on which the notice is given and of the day on which the trial begins. The notification issued under Rule 58 (1), which we have earlier quoted, must be understood in the light of the requirement of that rule. The notification did not specify any particular date from which the area was to be made available for grant; it only said that the area shall be available for grant after thirty days from the date of publication of notification. Understood in the light of Rule 58 that thirty clear days must intervene between the date of publication of notification and the date from which the area becomes available for grant, it follows that the area in the present case became available for grant from 15th September, 1969. In this view of the matter, the application made by M/s. Jailal Bharatial on 14th September, 1969, was premature. The Central Government was of the view that in counting the period of thirty days under Rule 58 (1) the data of publication of notification is also to be counted and, therefore, the application made on 14th September, 1969, was not premature. This view expressed in the impugned order proceeds upon a mis -construction of the rule and is apparently erroneous. As already stated, the correct construction of the rule is that thirty dear days must intervene between the date of publication of notification and the date from which the area is to be available for grant.