LAWS(MPH)-1964-12-12

HIMATSINGH KUBERSINGH Vs. BOARD OF REVENUE

Decided On December 08, 1964
HIMATSINGH KUBERSINGH Appellant
V/S
BOARD OF REVENUE Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a reference by two learned Judges of this Court hearing a petition under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeking, inter alia a writ of certiorari for quashing an order dated 31st October 1961 of the Board of Revenue rejecting the petitioner's application for a review of the decision dated 14th february 1959 of the Board of Revenue in an appeal under Section 29 of the madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, 1951 (hereinafter called the Act ). The Board of Revenue held that it had no power to review its decision given in an appeal under Section 29 of the Act. The question that the learned Judges of the Division bench have referred to us for decision is whether the Board of Revenue, has the power under the Act to review its decision given in an appeal preferred to the board of Revenue under Section 29 of the Act against an order of the Jagir commissioner.

(2.) AN appeal against a decision of the Jagir Commissioner lies to the Board of revenue under Section 29 (1) of the Act which runs as follows:

(3.) THE construction put by learned counsel for the petitioner on Section 30 of the act cannot be accepted. The first half of Section 30 clearly prescribes the procedure which the Jagir Commissioner or any other officers conducting an enquiry under the Act and the Board of Revenue and the Collector when hearing appeals from the orders of the Jagir Commissioner or the Tehsildar are required to follow when it says that they "shall follow the procedure applicable to proceedings under the Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, samvat 2007, so far as may be". This portion-of Section 30 does not in any way deal with the powers which the Jagir Commissioner or any other officer as an original authority or the Board of Revenue and the Collector as an appellate authority can exercise in their original or appellate jurisdiction. The second half of the section no doubt provides that these authorities "shall have the same powers, in relation to proceedings before them as a revenue officer has in relation to original or appellate proceedings, as the case may be" under the Tenancy Act. But this provision has not the result of conferring on those authorities the power of review given to the Board or any Revenue Officer under Section 40 of the Tenancy act. The power conferred by the second half of Section 30 is limited first by the expression "in relation to proceedings before them", and, again, by the expression "as a! revenue officer has in relation to original or appellate proceedings". Section 30 in the very beginning speaks of the Jagir Commissioner or any other officer functioning as an original authority and the Board of Revenue and the Collector functioning as an appellate authority. The power that is conferred by the latter half of the section is therefore in regard to the original proceedings before the Jagir commissioner or any other officer or the appellate proceedings before the Board of revenue and the Collector and that power is the same which a Revenue Officer has in relation to original or appellate proceedings under the Tenancy Act.