HARNARAIN GIYASILAL Vs. KANHAIYALAL GANESHLAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) - Petitioner Giyasilal (after his death, Harnarain and Santoshilal were placed on the record as legal representatives) filed the suit against defendant Kanhaiyalal, his tenant seeking eviction from the rented premises (a shop) on the ground that the shop was genuinely required by him to set up his son in business as a cloth merchant. The defence was that the notice served by the plaintiff is invalid, and, that the plaintiff does not genuinely require the accommodation. The trial Court decreed the suit. On appeal the learned District Judge, Gwalior, recorded a curious finding to the effect that because the plaintiff had inherited a flourishing money lending business from their deceased father, and, was already running a grocery business, therefore, it does not stand to reason why he wants to start a new cloth business. The plea of genuine necessity has been negatived on the ground that if a man is doing one business, then he is not supposed to start or do another business. There is neither rhyme nor reason in the assumption and I regard the finding as perverse. The first appellate Court also held that the notice to quit given by the plaintiff was invalid and in result dismissed the suit. This is plaintiff's second appeal.

(2.) I shall first take up the question whether the notice is valid or not. The tenancy in the instant case was created by virtue of a rent-note dated 26-2-1944, and was for a period of one year. In 1944, the Gwalior Letting of Residential Accommodation Control Order (No. 107 of 26th January 1944) was in force and according to section 12 (A) (1), "a tena.nt in possession of a house shall not be evicted therefrom, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise and whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance with the provisions of this clause." It will thus appear that after the efflux of the period of his tenancy, the tenant became a statutory tenant, because there is nothing on record to incline me to hold that the "landlord entered into any fresh contract of tenancy."

(3.) Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ganga Dutt Murarka v. Kartik Chandra Das and others(AIR1961 SC 1067), have held that where a tenant has acquired the status of statutory tenant, notice prescribed by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not necessary. In this view of the matter, following this Supreme Court ruling, I hold that no notice was necessary and therefore the question of invalidity does not at all arise.