HANSRAJ SHARMA @ HANSU Vs. SHIVCHARAN SHARMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revision is directed against the order passed by learned 14th Additional Sessions Judge, Indore in Criminal Revision No. 0/2003 on 13 -6 -2003.

(2.) BRIEFLY stated, the relevant facts giving rise to this revision petition are as under: -

(3.) LEARNED 14th Additional Sessions Judge, Indore after re -consideration allowed the revision petition filed by the complainant and set aside the order dated 30 -8 -2001 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class and he directed that complaint case under sections 467, 468 and 471 of Indian Penal Code be registered against only one Hansaraj Sharma @ Hansu out of the persons named as accused persons in the complaint. Hence, applicant has filed this revision petition. 1983 MPLJ 56; G.D. Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 7990 MPLJ 39 and Harun Khan and Others v. Mahesh Chandra and Others reported in (1997) 2 Crimes 301 (M.P.) 6. Learned counsel for the non -applicant has on the other hand contended that learned lower revisional Court did not commit any error. His submission is that revisional Court has jurisdiction to reverse the findings of the Magistrate and give its own finding and can take prima facie view of the allegations made in the complaint read with preliminary evidence led to show as to what offence has been committed by the accused prima facie. Learned counsel for the non -applicant has placed reliance on the cases of Narinder Pal Sood and Another v. State (Delhi Administration) and Another reported in 7997 Cri. L.J. 141 and Bal Kishan Jain and Others v. Indian Overseas Bank and Others reported in 7957 Cri.LJ. 796. 7. After considering the rival arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and going through the cases cited by the counsels for both the sides carefully, I am of the view that the revision does not deserve to be allowed and it must fail. In the cases of Rajaram Gupta, G. D. Singh and Harun Khan (supra) the scope of section 398 of the Code of Criminal Procedure alone has been considered. The scope of section 399 of the Code has not been considered or discussed at all in these cases. Perhaps, the issue might have been canvassed narrowly only on the scope of section 398 of the Code alone. Therefore, the cases (supra) do not render any help in resolving the real controversy which essentially urge to consider the joint scope of sections 398 and 399 of the Code. In these cases, no note of larger revisional powers, vested in Court of Sessions by virtue of section 399 read with section 401(1), has been taken. 8. Section 399 of the new Code prescribes the larger field of revisional powers of the Court of Sessions. In Bal Kishan Jain's case decided by the Divisional Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court reported in 1981 Cri.LJ. 796, the scope of revisional power of the Sessions Court under section 398 and 399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been discussed at length and this case renders considerable help in examining the joint scope of sections 398 and 399 of the Code. Section 398 of the Code is in pari materia with section 436 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and with section 437 of the earlier Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882. The necessity for having a separate provision like section 436 in the earlier Code was felt as the Court of Sessions in its revisional jurisdiction was primarily a reporting or a recommendatory Court and basic revisional powers were vested in High Court alone under section 439 of the Code. For meeting situation where a complaint was wrongly dismissed as a whole or an accused had been wrongly discharged, the Court of Sessions was given a larger power at par with the High Court, namely, that of the directing further enquiry into such cases. This was done by virtue of section 436 of the old Code. It was not necessary for the Court of Sessions to report the matter to High Court, but it could in its own right direct further enquiry within the narrow field of section 436 of the Code in sharp distinction to other cases where the Court could only recommend to the High Court for necessary action. 9. By the enactment of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Court of Sessions has been clothed with all or any of the powers which may be exercised by the High Court under section 401(1). This power has been conferred on the Court of Sessions by virtue of section 399. A provision in pari materia with section 436 of the old Code has been retained in the shape of section 398 of the new Code which may, of course, cause over -lapping in the field of powers of the Court of Sessions under sections 398 and 399 of the Code, but Court of Sessions is now clothed with the revisional powers under both sections 398 and 399 of the new Code. It is well settled that the revisional powers are to be read and construed together and not in isolated water tight compartment. Therefore, sections 398 and 399 of the new Code would have to be read together as one integral whole. Therefore, when a Court of Sessions exercises its revisional jurisdiction, the power under both sections 398 and 399 of the Code could be exercised by it and it would be immaterial to investigate as to which specific provision has been actually invoked by it. 10. The revisional powers of the Court of Sessions by virtue of section 399 of the Code could be substantially equated with those of the High Court under section 401(1) of the new Code of Criminal Procedure. The words 'further enquiry" used in section 398 do not envisage within it the power to direct that person wrongly discharged be summoned or that a charge under any particular section or sections of Indian Penal Code or any other enactment be framed against him and he be put on trial. Therefore, such a direction could not be given under section 398 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Nevertheless, direction of such nature could legally be given under section 399 read with section 401(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is repository of the larger powers vested in the Court of Sessions. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, the direction given by the learned Additional Sessions Judge seems to be well within his jurisdiction in exercise of revisional powers and revision is devoid of any merit. Hence, this revision is hereby dismissed.