PHOOLWATI HAKIM Vs. RAMESH MANOCHA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE facts material for the decision of this revision are in short as follows. The accommodation in question belonged to late Rai Bahadur Kasturilal, who had sold it to late T.N. Bhaskar. Shri T.N. Bhaskar, during his life time had filed two suits against the present applicant, in the civil Court, out of which one suit was for eviction and the other was for recovery of arrears of rent. In the written statements in the civil suits, specific plea was taken by the applicant that late Shri T.N. Bhaskar did not derive valid title to the accommodation in suit. During pendency of the two suits, Shri T.N. Bhaskar died and his legal heirs were brought on record. The L.Rs. in the year 1983 transferred the accommodation in dispute to the present non -applicants. The non -applicants as transferees from the L.Rs. of late Shri T.N. Bhaskar sought their substitution as plaintiffs in both the suits. The Civil Court permitted substitution of the non -applicants as plaintiffs to the suit for recovery of arrears of rent, in accordance with Order 22, Rule 10 of the Code. So far as the eviction suit is concerned, the Civil Court held that the present non -applicants could not plead their own bona fide need for eviction in the suit which was filed by their predecessor in title. The eviction suit was, therefore, withdrawn by the non -applicants. After withdrawal of the eviction suit from the civil Court, the non -applicants filed an application before the Rent Controlling Authority, under section 23 -A of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, for eviction of the applicant as tenant, by summary procedure prescribed for landlords of specified category. The resort to the procedure of summary eviction through the R.C.A. was made as one of the non -applicants as a landlord, is a handicapped person and falls in the specified category of landlords, who are entitled to avail of summary procedure of eviction.

(2.) THE applicant, as a tenant, filed an application seeking leave to defend under section 23 -C of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The leave was sought to defend, pleading inter alia that the question of derivative title to the suit accommodation by the present non -applicants was a matter directly and substantially involved for decision in the civil suit pending in the civil Court for recovery of arrears of rent. Along with the application seeking leave to defend the eviction proceedings on the above plea, the applicant made an application under section 10 read with section 151 of the Code for stay of the proceedings before the R.C.A. pending decision of the civil suit in the Civil Court.

(3.) HELD : Having considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, in my opinion, the revision has no force and deserves to be dismissed. Obviously, section 10 of the Code is not attracted in this case because the subsequently instituted proceedings before the Rent Controlling Authority is not a suit. The learned counsel for the tenant has invited by attention to the contents of opening paragraph of section 23 -A of the Act, which lay down that the application to be filed before the R.C.A. should be signed and verified in the manner provided in Rules 14 and 15 of Order VI of the first schedule to the Civil Procedure Code of 1908. On a close examination of contents of section 23 -A of the Act I find that the application before the R.C.A. by fiction is treated to be a plaint only for the purpose of signing and verification, in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure. The application before, the R.C.A. filed under Chapter III -A, however, for the above reason that the application is to be signed and verified as a plaint, cannot be treated to be a suit. Hon'ble P.C. Pathak, J. (as he then was), in the case of Mst. Jinnat Bai (1986 MPRCJ N 99), has rightly pointed out that the provisions of section 11 -A of the Act, which specifically make inapplicable the provisions of Chapter III, require filing a suit for eviction in the civil Court. To such specified categories of landlords defined, in section 23 -J of the Act, the provisions of Chapter III -A, are not applicable. The landlords not falling in the category defined in section 23 -J have to seek eviction through civil suit, whereas the specified categories of landlords thereunder can resort to summary remedy of eviction through an application to the Rent Controlling Authority under Chapter -III -A of the Act. The application for eviction before the Rent Controlling Authority, therefore, cannot be treated to be a suit. Similarly the Rent Controlling Authority cannot be held to be a Court for the purpose of section 10 of the Code. I rely on a decision on the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of M. Subharamayya and others v. Batchu Narasimha Swamy and another (AIR 1972 Andhra Pradesh 186), in which under similar circumstances, application of a tenant for stay of eviction proceedings before the R.C.A. under the Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, was rejected. The other decision in the case of M/s. Fulchand Motilal and another (AIR 1973 Pat. 196) relied on by the counsel for the tenant is distinguishable as there were two suits. The ratio in that case has, therefore, to be deduced accordingly. I find no substance in the contention advanced in this revision, on behalf of the applicant tenant, for more reasons than those, already stated above. For attracting provisions of section 10 of the Code, the Court in the former case should be competent to try and grant relief in subsequently instituted proceedings. In respect of specified categories of landlords falling under section 23 -1 of, the Act, the R.C.A. has jurisdiction. The summary procedure of eviction cannot be resorted to by the Civil Court and the Civil Court is not competent to try and grant relief in relation to the subject matter of the proceedings instituted before the R.C.A. I am not impressed by the argument of the tenant that the question of derivative title pending in the civil Court would be binding on the parties and, therefore, the R.C.A. should have stayed the proceedings before it. If the argument advanced on behalf of the tenant is accepted, the specified category of landlords would be deprived of the summary and speedy procedure of seeking eviction from the accommodation. It is open to the tenant to raise all contentions and pleas based on derivative title and the Rent Controlling Authority would be competent to decide the same in the proceedings before it. Merely for the reason that the main defence of the tenant, based on derivative title is pending adjudication before the Civil Court, proceedings for eviction in a summary manner, pending before a specially constituted statutory authority cannot be stayed. Such a course would not be in the interest of justice and no inherent powers under section 151 of the Code can be taken aid of. I am supported in my view by the decision of our own High Court, rendered by Hon'ble P.C. Pathak, J. in the case of Mst. Jinnat Bai (supra) and of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of M. Subharamayya and others (supra). AIR 1972 AP 186 and 1986 MPRCJ N 99 relied on. AIR 1973 Pat. 196 distinguished. Revision dismissed.