LAWS(MPH)-1993-3-37

JAGAT SINGH Vs. FIRM DHARAMCHAND RAMESHCHAND

Decided On March 18, 1993
JAGAT SINGH Appellant
V/S
Firm Dharamchand Rameshchand Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) APPELLANT /defendant feels aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 2.2.1985 passed by Civil Judge Class -I, in Civil Suit No. 76 -B of 1979 as affirmed by the judgment and decree dated 18.2.1988pilssed by Shri AjitKapoor, Additional District Judge, Ashoknagar, District Guna, in Civil Appeal No. 3 -B of 1985 and challenges legality and validity thereof in this second appeal u/s 100 C.P.C.

(2.) CASE of the respondents is that on 9.9.1976 the appellant borrowed a sum of Rs. 3,225/ - from them and signed document Ex. P -2. It is further alleged that the respondent also directed payment of Rs. 63/ - to HimmatSingh and signed the said document. Lateron, that amount was not repaid and hence the present suit was filed for recovery thereof. The respondent prayed for a decree of the principal sums together with interest on the same. The appellant denied the claim including the fact that he took any loan on 9.9.1976. His specific case is that he had settled the earlier accounts and had signed the Khatabahi in that context. He claims that lateron he has paid the amount by supplying wheat and gram and hence nothing remains due.

(3.) THE submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff is that the suit is barred by limitation and hence the impugned judgment and decree deserve to be set aside. According to the lead counsel the loan is said to have been taken on 9.9.1976 and since the suit was filed on 10.9.1979, it is barred by limitation. According to him, the matter is governed by Article 19 of Limitation Act and hence the suit should have been filed latest by 8.9.1979. Inspite of it, it is admitted that 9.9.1979 was Sund2.Y and, therefore, the suit could not have been filed on that date. This fact is also mentioned in the plaint. Under the circumstances if the period of limitation is to be counted from 9.9.1976, the suit would be barred by limitation but if the period is counted from 10.9.1976, the suit would be within time. Article 19 provides a period of three years as limitation for suits for recovery of money and mentions that three years would be counted from the date when the loan is made. In this case the loan was admittedly advanced on 9.9.1976 and, therefore, the period of limitation starts running immediately thereafter. This is also the requirement of section 12 (1) of the Act. If the period of limitation is counted from 10.9.1976 the last date of limitation would be 9.9.1979. Since that was a Sunday the suit was filed on 10.9.1979. This Court, therefore, finds no substance in the argument that the suit was barred by limitation.