GAJANAN SAW MILL Vs. STATE OF M P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS order shall govern the disposal of all the Writ petitions mentioned above. We propose to deal with these Writ petitions in two groups. In one group will be writ Petition No. 684 of 1972-- Babulal and Co. v. The State of M. P. and Ors. In the other group will be all other Writ 'petitions in which facts are similar. The only distinction between these two groups is that in the case of Babulal and Co. v. The state of M. P. (M. P. No. 684 of 1972), the forest authorities had communicated to the petitioner. Babulal. acceptance of his highest bid and he was delivered possession of the coupe and it is his allegation that work had already been started and subsequently he was asked to stop the work and hand back possession to the forest department. In all other cases either no orders were passed regarding acceptance of the highest bids or in some cases orders had been passed by the proper authorities and the same had been communicated to the subordinate forest officers. But. such orders were not despatched for being communicated to the forest contractors. Therefore, it is the contention of the respondents that the contracts in all other Writ petitions wera inchoate, which would not confer any rights on those petitioners. Whatever rights may have become choate would be in favour of M/s. Babulal and Co. alone.

(2.) ON 21-7-1972 (Vide Annexura 5) there was a Gazette Notification intimating that forest contracts in respect of timber, firewood and charcoal for Sagar division would be auctioned on 4-8-1972 and 5-8-1972. The auctions were duly held on those two dates and the present petitioners were the highest bidders and their bids were higher than the upset price fixed by the department. The petitioners on 4-8-1972 deposited 10% of the auction price as required by the Rules. They also deposited security as required. So far as the case of M/s. Babulal and Co. is concerned, the competent authority, namely, the Conservai tor of Forests accepted his bid on 12-8-1972. He deposited 10% of the auction price as also the security and signed the contract on 12-8-1972. The acceptance of his bid was also communicated to him. But, in other cases, although orders about acceptance had been passed and, had been sent to the subordinate forest authorities, such orders were not at all despatched to the forest contractors. In some cases no such orders of acceptance had been passed, and further auction in respect of those contracts was suspended as the State intended to take action under the Madhya Pradesh van Upai (Vyapar Viniyaman) Adhiniyam. 1969 (No. 9 of 1969) (Madhya Pradesh forest Produce (Trade Regulation) Act. 1969 ). The said Act was extended to Sagar division with, effect from 14-9-1972. On that date the contract of M/s. Babulal and co. alone was legally finalised and the said firm had started working the forest. But, in all other cases there was no such finali-sation and work was suspended. A notification dated 14-9-1972 (Vide respondents' Annexure 4) was issued applying the said Act to the Sagar division. Thereafter the petitioners made demands which were turned down by the respondents and consequently the present petitions were filed in October 1972, or thereabout and it was after filing of the Writ petitions that the petitioners were intimated by the forest authorities that their bids had not been accepted. A works order dated 21-8-1972 (Vide petitioners' Annexure B/l)had also been issued to M/s. Babulal and Co. But in all other cases no such order had been issued, nor acceptance of bids had been communicated by the competent autho- rities. The learned counsel for the petitioners urged that as the respondents had advertised sale of forest produce by public auctions and that auctions had already been held, the respondents could not thereafter withhold acceptance of the, bid. In support of this contention the learned counsel invoked the doctrine of promissory estoppel and urged that the respondents could not so back on their public declarations under the guise of taking action under the M. P. Van Upaj (Vyapar Viniyaman) Adhiniyam. 1969, which had come into force much before the auction sales were held and which was applied to the Sagar division after the auctions were held but before the acceptance could be communicated to the other petitioners except M/s. Babulal and Co. It is, therefore, necessary to examine as to how far the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel can be applied to auctions which might be termed either executive or quasi-legislative in the matter of applying the provisions of a statute.

(3.) IN Halsbury's Laws of England (Third Edition) Volume 15, at page 175, the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel is elucidated as under:-" when one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a promise or assurance which was intended to affect the legal relations between them and to be acted on accordingly, then, once the other party has taken him at his word and acted on it the one who gave the promise or assurance cannot afterwards be allowed to revert to their previous legal relations as if no such promise or assurance had been made by him. but he must accept their legal relations subject to the qualification which he himself has so introduced. This doctrine, which is derived from a principle of equity enunciated in 1877, has been the subject of considerable recent development. It differs from estoppel properly so-called in that the presentation relied upon need not be one of present fact. The doctrine may have been too widely stated in recent cases and its limits are not yet finally settled. The doctrine cannot create any new cause of action where none existed before, and it would seem that the person who has made the representation may once again enforce his legal rights after the other party has had an opportunity of regaining the position he held before the representation was made if that is possible. The doctrine is known variously as "equitable" or "promissory" or 'quasi' estoppel".