NAHAR HIRASINGH Vs. DUKALHIN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS opinion shall govern the disposal of this Letters Patent Appeal as also the second Appeal No 91 of 1966 -- (Durgaprasad v. Chunnilal ).

(2.) THE present Letters Patent Appeal has been referred to this Court for decision of the entire appeal by a Division Bench of this Court, by order, dated 31-3-1971, as also for decision of the question whether a Bhumiswami under the Madhya pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, is a tenure holder within the meaning of section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act. 1956. That question is also involved in second Appeal No. 91 of 1966 (Madh Pra ). Therefore, by this opinion, we propose to decide that question and later on, we propose to decide the Letters Patent appeal on merits. On expression of the opinion on the question referred Second appeal No. 91 of 1966, will have to so back to the Single Bench for decision on merits in accordance with the opinion of this Full Bench. Along with these two cases. Second Appeal No. 447 of 1966 (Madh Pra) -- (Smt. Rangu v. Anji) had already been referred to this Full Bench for opinion on the question relating to section 164 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code. 1959. However, in that case it was found that the appellants and respondents were remoter heirs and the deceased. Krishnarao had left a son, whose existence was disclosed during the pendency of the case before this Full Bench. Therefore, the decision of the question referred was more or less of an academic nature and consequently, by order, dated 25th September 1973, we allowed that appeal and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit holding that the plaintiffs and defendants had no right to the property left by the deceased Krishnarao, whose son is living. In the presence of the son other remoter heirs could have no claim to the property of the deceased.

(3.) IN the Letters Patent Appeal, one more question of law is involved namely, whether under Section 164 as it stood then, the female mentioned in Subsection (2) of Section 164 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code. 1959, was a female who had herself inherited the property under Sub-section (1) of that Section. For that reason the entire case was referred to this Full Bench for decision on merits as well.