(1.) THE non -applicant Lalu in the present case made an application on 1 -7 -1948 to the Court below to set aside a decree passed by consent on 1 -5 -1948 in an appeal in which he was the Respondent. In this application the non -applicant alleged that he had No. knowledge of the compromise, that he did not actually agree to the terms of the compromise and that he did not sign the petition of compromise, and in fact he had no notice of the appeal, he did not appear in the appeal at all and had nothing to do with the petition of compromise. The non -applicant suggested that the applicant, who was the Appellant in the Court below obtained from the Court a consent decree fraudulently by suppressing the service of summons and by getting a false and fraudulent petition of compromise filed and by making someone appear' in the Court as the Respondent in the appeal for the verification of the petition of compromise.
(2.) IT is contended on behalf of the Petitioner that a decree by consent can be set aside only by a regular suit; that the consent decree passed in the appeal was not an ex parte decree and could not be set aside upon an application under Order 9, Rule 13; and that at any rate the learned Additional District Judge was not justified in setting aside the decree without holding a proper inquiry into the question whether the compromise arrived at in the appeal was effected by the non -applicant Lalu.
(3.) IT seems to me that the instant case (sic) be disposed of on the question whether the (sic) cation to set aside the consent decree came (sic) Order 9, Rule 13 or not. The non -applicant (sic) self did not purport to file his application (sic) aside the decree under Order 9, Rule 13. (sic) stating the circumstances in which the (sic) decree was passed he simply prayed that the (sic) should set aside the decree. The real (sic) that arises for determination is whether the (sic) has inherent power to set aside the decree (sic) on a compromise.