MOHD SAGIR Vs. BHARAT HEAVY ELECTRICALS LTD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has challenged the validity of the order dated 16-3-2005 passed by the Industrial Court. The background facts, necessary for adjudication of the controversy involved in the writ petition, briefly stated, are that the petitioner was appointed as medical attendant grade-2 on 9-6-1977 on probation for a period of six months in the hospital of the respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as 'the company') at Habibganj. The petitioner remained absent from 15-4-1978 for a period exceeding thirty days. Thereupon a notice dated 4/16-5-1978 was sent by registered post to the petitioner by which he was asked to resume his duty within three days. It was further informed that if the petitioner remains absent for more than thirty days, it would be presumed that he is not interested in serving the company and shall be deemed to have left services of the company and his name shall be struck off. The aforesaid notice was received by the petitioner on 20-5-1978. However, the petitioner neither joined the duty nor submitted an application for his unauthorised absence. Thereafter in exercise of power under clause 42(10) of the Standing Orders, the name of the petitioner was struck off from the roll of the company with effect from 15-4-1978 on the ground that he has voluntarily abandoned his services.

(2.) The petitioner approached the company on 21-9-1978 and requested for supply of copy of the order dated 4-6-1978 which was supplied to him on the same day. The petitioner thereafter filed an application on 22-8-1980 under section 31(3) of the M.P. Industrial Relations Act, 1961 (in short 'the Act') on the ground that his services have wrongly been terminated without holding the departmental enquiry which constitutes violation of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short 'the 1947 Act'). The Labour Court vide order dated 9-9-1985 held that the claim of the petitioner is barred by limitation. However, the Labour Court found that in similar circumstances other employees have been re-employed and, therefore, the company should consider the case of the petitioner for re-employment. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order the petitioner as well as the company filed the appeal before the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court by the order dated 28-2-1992 decided both the appeals and remanded the matter to the Labour Court to decide all the issues afresh.

(3.) The Labour Court vide order dated 11-3-1995 inter alia, held that the petitioner was submitting the representations and there is delay of five months. Accordingly, the Labour Court found that sufficient cause for condonation of delay is made out. Labour Court further held that termination of the services of the petitioner amounts to retrenchment and the same constitutes violation of section 25-F of the 1947 Act. Accordingly, a direction was issued for reinstatement without backwages. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner as well as the company preferred appeals before the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court vide order dated 27-6-2002, held that the Labour Court has no power to condone the delay in filing the application under section 31 of the Act. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed whereas the appeal preferred by the company was allowed. The petitioner challenged the order passed by Industrial Court in writ petition before this Court. The Full Bench of this Court in Mohd. Sagir vs. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., 2004 2 MPLJ 359 held that the Labour Court has power to condone the delay in filing the application under section 31 of the Act. Accordingly, the matter was remanded to the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court vide order dated 16-3-2005 inter alia, held that the delay in filing the application under section 31 of the Act could not have been condoned in the absence of any application for condonation of delay. It was further held that the petitioner failed to prove that the order dated 4-6-1978 was passed in violation of the Standing Order. Accordingly, the Industrial Court came to the conclusion that the name of the petitioner was rightly struck off from the roll of the company. In the aforesaid factual backdrop, the petitioner has approached this Court.