(1.) This appeal is by the defendants, which was admitted by a Bench of this Court on the following substantial question of law:--
(2.) The Trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 23-12-2002 held that the plaintiff is in lawful possession of the suit land. However, it was held that defendants have interfered with the possession of the plaintiff over the suit land and during the pendency of the suit have taken forcible possession of the part of the suit land in the year 1997. Accordingly, it was held that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for possession in respect of the land of which forcible possession was taken by the defendant during pendency of suit. The Trial Court also granted decree for declaration of title in favour of the plaintiff. Accordingly, the suit was decreed. The Lower Appellate Court vide impugned judgment and decree dated 14-2-2004, inter alia, held that since the plaintiff had not sought the relief of declaration of title, therefore, the Trial Court could not have granted the relief of declaration of title. The Lower Appellate Court further held that the relief of possession is not time-barred as the plaintiff is entitled to exclusion of time spent in the proceeding in the Revenue Court under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. However, remaining part of the decree passed by the Trial Court was affirmed.
(3.) Learned Counsel for the appellants while inviting the attention of this Court, Paragraph 16 of the judgment passed by the Trial Court has submitted that defendants are in possession of the land in dispute since 1974 and the suit was filed in the year 1993 initially seeking the relief of permanent injunction and thereafter the relief of possession was sought by way of amendment in the year 1998, which was barred by limitation. It is also urged that if the amendment which is barred by limitation is allowed, it would not relate back to the institution of the suit. It is also urged that Lower Appellate Court erred in not appreciating that time spent in the proceeding pending before the Revenue Court, could not have taken into account for the purpose of extending the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In support of his submission, learned Counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the decision of Supreme Court in Jai Prakash and others Vs. Satnarain and others, 1994 Supp1 SCC 153 and Kanhaiyalal Vishwambherdayal Agrawal Vs. Muktilal Rameshwardas Naredi, 2007 AIR(MP) 1