(1.) THIS is plaintiff's second appeal under Section 100, CPC. The following substantial question of law was formulated at the time of admission by order dated 24-7-1985:-" whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Court below has erred in not awarding interest from the date of the suit till realisation ?"
(2.) THE plaintiff instituted the civil suit for recovery of Rs. 10,000/-against the Railways for non-delivery of sixty bags of grains. The suit was decreed by the Trial Court that decree has not been challenged by the defendants. The Trial Court did not allow any interest on the decretal amount. The First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal of the plaintiff against that part of the order of the Trial Court. First Appellate Court had found that the plaintiff had purchased the grain at Rs. 125/- per bag and his claim for damages at the rate of Rs. 170/- per bag has been decreed. Therefore, the First Appellate Court also declined to grant any interest pendente lite and to the date of realisation of the decretal amount.
(3.) DURING the course of hearing of this appeal, the learned Counsel for the appellant has argued that the interest on the decretal amount ought to have been awarded and it is only the rate of interest which was in the discretion of the Court. Reliance has been placed on a Division Bench decision of Calcutta High Court in W. B. Financial Corporation v. Bertram Scott (I) Ltd. , AIR 1983 Calcutta 381, in which it has been held that the Court has no discretion as to whether pendente lite interest should be granted or not. The Court is bound to grant such interest. The Court has discretion only as to the rate of interest. On the other hand it has been argued that use of the word "may" in Section 34 of CPC clearly indicates that the Courts have the discretion to grant or not to grant the interest from the date of the suit to the date of realisation of the amount and in the facts of the present case, the two Courts have found that it is not expedient to grant interest and therefore, this Court can not interfere in the exercise of that discretion.