(1.) THE question, however, arises as to what offence is made out against the appellants. Admittedly a single injury by knife was caused to the deceased Radhelal in his left thigh which is non - vital part It is true that the injury was deep enough cutting the artery which caused haemorrhage and shock resulting into his death but it could not be said that the appellants knew that artery would, be cut resulting into haemorrhage and shock. That being so though the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the victim but it cannot be said that the appellants had intended to commit murder. In these circumstances section 300, Thirdly, of the Indian Penal Code could not be applied. However, the medical evidence shows that the injury was deep enough cutting the artery and thus it can well be said that a massive blow by knife was given to the victim from which intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death is clearly made out. The appellants are, therefore, clearly liable for an offence under section 304, Part I of the Indian Penal Code. In some what similar circumstances, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Harjinder Singh v. Delhi Administration (AIR 1958 SC 867) and Gokul v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1981 SC 1441) took the similar view. We accordingly hold the appellants guilty for an offence under section 304, Part I of the Indian Penal Code read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
(2.) IN the result, the appeal partly succeeds and is hereby allowed. The conviction of the appellants Chandnath Singh, Ramasahu and Sanjay Sharma under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code with sentence there under is set aside. Instead, they are convicted under section 304, Part I of the Indian Penal Code read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and each one of them is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years. AIR 1958 SC 867 and AIR 1981 SC 1441 followed. Appeal partly allowed.