LAWS(MPH)-1992-1-4

DHIRENDRA Vs. STATE BANK OF INDIA

Decided On January 31, 1992
DHIRENDRA Appellant
V/S
STATE BANK OF INDIA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) HEARD Shri N.K. Patni, for the applicant and Shri R.C. Maheshwari for the non -applicant.

(2.) THIS revision application challenges the order dated 10 -8 -1991 passed by the Xth Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Indore allowing an amendment in the plaint. The main contention of Shri Patni, learned counsel for the applicant is that the suit was closed for judgment at the time the plaintiff moved an application for amendment. According to Shri Patni when once the case was closed for judgment, no further application could be moved in the case. He relied heavily upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Arjunsingh v. Mohindrakumar and Ors., AIR 1964 SC 993. Shri R.C. Maheshwari learned counsel for the non -applicant tried to distinguish the decision of the Supreme Court in Arjunsingh's case (supra) by contending that, that case applied only to an application under Order 9, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the 'Code') being filed after the case was closed for judgment. According to him there is a difference in the provisions of Order 9 and Order 6 of the Code. He further contended that Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code permitted an amendment application at any stage of the suit and date of decision was also a stage of the suit. He tried to draw a comparison between Order 9 and other provisions of the Code and stated that amendment applications have been allowed by the Court after a preliminary decree was passed. He also raised a question as to whether an application for compromise under Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code could also not be entertainable after the case is closed for judgment. He relied on rulings reported in AIR 1974 AP 201, AIR 1976 Del. 56, 1989 MPLJ 750 = 1989 JLJ 359 and AIR 1969 SC 1267. He contended that rules of procedure are handmaid of justice and cannot be allowed to defeat justice.

(3.) IT is, therefore, clear from the aforesaid discussion that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain or allow an application under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code after the closure of the case for judgment and before pronouncing the judgment. A certified copy of the judgment in Civil Rev. No. 241/89 of this Court was shown to me by the learned counsel for the non -applicant. However, that is the case on the point of delay and not on the point of entertainability of the application between the closure of the case for judgment and pronouncement of judgment. It has, therefore, no application to the case just as other cases cited on behalf of the non -applicants have no application to the present case. So far as the argument that procedure is handmaid of justice and should not be allowed to defeat it based on AIR 1969 SC 1267, suffice it to say that where specific provision is made in the code for amendment, there is a no scope for invoking inherent powers and this aspect has also been considered by the Supreme Court in AIR 1964 SC 993.