MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, GUNA Vs. GHASILAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) SEVEN matters were heard analogously by S. K. Dubey, J., sitting singly, and by common order passed on 23 -6 -1992, he has referred these matters to be decided by Larger Bench having taken the view that the law stated in Municipal Council, Shivpuri v. Radha Bai and Anr., 990 C. Cr. J. 100 =1990 II MPWN 78 :, 1990 MPJR SN 42, by a learned Single Judge of this Court, required reconsideration. Thus, all these seven matters, we heard analogously and are being finally disposed of by this common Order. In this appeal as also in the other connected matters, verdict of acquittal is challenged and the common question of law is if the verdict rendered in each case on the common ground of limitation is legal or not. Prosecution hunched by Municipal Council of Guna and Morena, against differences alleged to be committed by them under the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities; Act, 1961, for short, the 'Act', is nullified by the verdict. The common feature of prosecution of the different accused persons in different cases is noteworthy being relevant to the controversy mooted in these matters. In all cases, the offences complained of are punishable with fine only and the prosecution is held to be time -barred, applying Section 463 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Reliance is placed in each case by the trial Court on this Court's decision in Radha Bai (supra). In each of the cases, (he finding of trial Court is categorical that prosecution has been launched beyond six months and, therefore, as contemplated under Section 468 (2) (a), Cr. P. C., the same is time -barred and it is not saved by Section 313 of the Act. For the disposal of these matters, no other facts are to be stated as that common finding reached in each of the cases by the trial Court in rendering the verdict of acquittal is not assailed on any side.

(2.) WE would extract, therefore, the core provisions competing with each other to decide the question of applicability of the appropriate provision as that is the moot question raised in all these matters :

(3.) ALTHOUGH Section 2 (n), Cr. P. C. defines the term "offence" in a generic sense, in categorical terms, acts and omissions which constitute offences are specified in Chapter IX of the Act, captioned "Municipal Powers and Offences". Section 313 of Chapter XI deal obviously with the procedure, to the extent specified, to be followed for punishing the offences contemplated under the Act the Act is to be regarded as a "local law" in terms of Section 42 IPC read with Section 2 (y), Cr. P. C. for the purpose of Section 5, Cr. P. C. In virtue of the combined effect of Sections 4 and 5 Cr. P. C., the provisions of the Act with respect to the offences contemplated under the Act and punishment thereof prevail against those of Cr. P. C. He think, Shri R. D. Jain, learned counsel, appearing for the Municipal Councils, is right in pointing out to us that when decision of this Court in Radha Bai (supra) was rendered, attention of the Court was not drawn to the provisions of Section 5, Cr. P. C. which, in express terms, saves the applicability of "any special or local law for the time being in force" and this provision also we extract :